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ARMED FORCES

Organized Crime Establishing Contacts in Military

94UM0453A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by Yeena Sizova in the column "Warning":
"Would You Step on a Rake?"]

[Text]

Friedship With Mafia Always a One-Way Street, Even for Military

Especially visible among the many less than hopeful trends current today is a pronounced increase in professionalism of organized crime. In literally one year, the domestic "Cosa Nostra" has progressed from minor stabbings and senseless random shootings to surprisingly accurate explosions in offices and residences, to contract killings carried out with a sniper's precision, to highly sophisticated criminally planned motor vehicle accidents.

It appears in general that the amateurs have been replaced by professionals, ones carrying out, rather than merely organizing, the crimes. This has been accompanied by another trend: a lowering of the average age of the criminals.

Just how is the youth of the criminals carrying out crimes associated with professionalism? The answer to that question is unbelievably simple. Shadow structures are attempting to involve in "business" the engineer troop, Marine, airborne trooper or, in a word, specialists who have received a particular kind of training in Army service. This is not only a simple solution, but also an inexpensive one, so to speak.

Although much has been said about the criminal world's increased interest in servicemen, very few details have been made known. Conventional wisdom has it that the only thing the Armed Forces have that is of interest to the Mafia is weapons. This being the case, preventive measures in effect in units, if any are applied, are based primarily (if not exclusively) on this aspect of the problem. Nonetheless, presently targeted by the Russian "camorra" just as intensively as the above is the Army's cadres. In this connection, criminal agents do not limit their efforts to enlisting the aid of men already discharged into the reserve. Several examples follow.

Cadet N. (whose investigation is still in progress) of the Pacific Ocean Higher Naval School acquired the habit of taking his automatic rifle from the weapons room, once a week over a period of six months, with the purpose being - of all things! - providing guard service to narcotics traffickers. Outrageous? This unfortunately is not an isolated case, since other military schools are experiencing this kind of occurrence. This falls under the category of individual "creative activity."

Incidentally, there also exists a group activity. It came to light that, until recently, representatives of regional

groupings of organized crime were holding conferences on Tuesdays in a Vladivostok stadium. One item unfailingly included on the "agenda" was the question of utilizing Marine servicemen and subunits. Marines specially selected because of their remarkable physical conditioning were tasked with blackmailing competitors, often with the use of force. Made on the Tuesdays was a decision of how to deploy the "rapid deployment group" for the next job.

Other examples could be cited. The essence of the activity consists of effective organization, ease of finding willing participants, and relatively low cost of the "workforce." In addition, there is the possibility of using standard issue weapons. The foregoing inspires the domestic variety of the "Cosa Nostra" to mount ambitious searches for enlisting the aid of the man in uniform.

Just how is "recruitment" carried out? My work involves meeting various officials, including representatives of the military procuracy. They state that organized crime employs a widespread network of informants and doers. First on the targeting list are persons who have a criminal record prior to entering military service. The number of this kind of person in some units is as high as 20 percent, meaning that the supply of persons is large.

Let us assume (theoretically) for the moment that in a particular regiment there is not a single person bearing a criminal past. Let us assume that. However, trying to imagine that in the regiment there is not a single serviceman dealing in fuel, canned meat, condensed milk, and other "small items" in our country is an exercise in futility. The "recruiter" will get to them, also.

Take the case of Private Ishin, who was stationed in a unit of the Far Eastern Military District. As his term of service neared completion, the soldier started to sell fuel "on the side." Representatives of shadow structures provided him with an easy and lucrative business. They later ordered some kinds of spare parts and once more paid him well. Ishin by that time had been discharged, but he did not depart from the unit, in that he was hired as a civilian driver. That is how he earned extra money, based on his friendship with the "authorities." The logical conclusion of this friendship was his receiving an order to steal weapons, an act which caused his "downfall."

Generally speaking, few servicemen who become involved with criminals realize the full seriousness of their actions. They often rely on their contacts and an unreal conviction in imagined benefactors.

A major group at risk in this connection are the so-called "runners," soldiers who absent themselves from their unit without official leave. To find such persons, the "Cosa Nostra" has special intercept persons who station themselves at railroad stations, bus stations, and airports. The deserters possess no money, as a rule. All of a sudden, present on the scene is a "savior," who offers the deserter an opportunity of earning the price of a ticket. What comes next? Nothing less than slave labor, languishing in some warehouse, a bed consisting of boxes,

poor food. Subsequently, the "runner" is told that he has done nothing for which he can be paid, and that, on the contrary, he has fallen into debt.

A system of fines spread throughout the criminal medium imposes monetary deficits, with the cause cited - for example - of taking up space in a warehouse in which the deserter does not belong (not an exaggeration). It is possible to turn off the "meter," partially at least, but only at the cost of sinking even more deeply into the quagmire. There exist many instances of that.

Take another case of a regimental headquarters of a military builders' detachment. Local mafiosi made duty Sergeant M. (whose investigation has not yet been completed) an offer to sell drugs. They quoted a sum of money they intended to receive, one considerably less than the going rate. This duty soldier, with the smell of easy money in the air, gave his assent. He did this a couple of times. Then he was told: "Young man, you are in this over your head. There is no way you can get away from us." The drug dealer, working in his profession of a "condemned man," was active for several weeks, then he was arrested. Meanwhile, a search was on for someone else who would like to "earn some money."

Especially alarming is how easily taken is the bait - first sweet promises, then abject bondage - by officer cadres, not only enlisted personnel. There is a disciplinary battalion stationed on Russkiy Island. It is a restricted post. It does not appear to have any ties to the mainland. Nonetheless, rumor had it that a man arriving from the "big land" had given away a considerable sum of money "out of friendliness." To whom? To officers awaiting discharge. Why had he done this? To pave the way for future cooperation in the civilian sector. The interested officers were told the details. The offer was tempting. It involved vessels of the merchant fleet performing primarily "Japanese" voyages. Foreign-made goods may be brought in. Some persons agreed to participate. Only later was it determined that the first three motor vehicles were intended for a "sponsor." But the deal had already been concluded.

We cannot be remiss by not mentioning how the Mafia deals with people who are stubborn, violate the "rules of the game," or outlive their usefulness. Agencies exercising jurisdiction over these matters are of the opinion that it is fairly difficult to help people who become deeply involved. However, it is possible (and necessary) to do something else: Warn anyone having any thoughts of taking advantage of the "unselfish" help offered by "friends" in a regimental headquarters.

Finally, is everything clear? If someone steps on a rake, he will undoubtedly be struck in the head, no matter how carefully he does the stepping. That is how the tool is made.

Therefore, does it not make sense to do some thinking about this beforehand?

POLICY

Discussion of Provisions of Draft Law on Defense Order

94UM0447A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "A Draft Law on the Defense Order Exists. The Important Thing Is for It Not To Be Pigeonholed"]

[Text] A discussion of the bill "On the State Defense Order" took place in the State Duma Committee for Industry, Construction, Transportation and Energy. By this point ministries and departments interested in the law in one way or another had studied the draft and had supplemented it with their own proposals. Around 30 major defense industry enterprises also submitted their conclusions to the Committee. After undergoing some changes, the bill departed for the next segment of its thorny path—according to the Duma calendar, consideration in the first reading lies ahead at the end of June.

Grigoriy Zhorin, head of the military-industrial complex sector in the Duma Committee, who put much effort into the law for the defense industry back behind the walls of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, does not rule out that opponents of the draft will be found in the Duma, inasmuch as it is a question of the federal budget. And recent parliamentary debates over the 1994 state budget showed that there are many proponents of financial suffocation of defense enterprises among deputies. The fact is, the R18 trillion being sought (and rejected in the course of the first reading) were intended specifically for the defense order. But those same votes showed that there still were more people in the hall who understood this (according to my observations, around 170), which means there also is hope for success.

Strictly speaking, what is this law about that is coming into being? It defines the status and the legal and economic principles of forming, placing and fulfilling the State Defense Order for delivery of products and fulfillment of work in the interests of Russia's defense, security, and law and order. A provision has been put into a legal rule for the first time that the development and series manufacture of set-completing articles and special materials is an inalienable part of the defense order (a through [skvoznoy] order). Program development of arms and military equipment is envisaged for periods of 15, 10 and 5 years, and even for one year. An article is included about mandatory execution of the defense order and about the parties' responsibility.

In the developers' opinion, the Law "On the State Defense Order" will permit realizing Russian Federation military doctrine more fully and will strengthen the financial incentive of all executors of the State Defense Order, including for creating and producing set-completing articles and materials regardless of forms of ownership and departmental subordination. The law will elevate the role of state contracts and agreements, will

allow competitive placement of the defense order to be put into practice, and guarantees material-technical resources for needs of the military-industrial complex.

Of course, no matter how ideal it might be, the law itself can remain only good intentions if the state does not find the money to support it. The paradox of our present economic life consists specifically of the fact that at times one has to "defend himself against the state itself." And any federal budget knocked together according to the principle "the fewer funds allocated for defense, the better" will reduce the most sensible law, including one on the defense order, to dust. It would appear the budget is above the law. Sometimes it seems to be above the Constitution. At any rate, purely financial considerations have been winning victories lately over any other considerations, even those of common sense. And the financier offhandedly pins both physicists as well as lyric poets to the mat. In this struggle the military and defense industry workers are placed in the lightest weight category.

But one should not grieve in advance, especially as the bill is destined to pass through the filters of committees and discussions of the first and second readings. Perhaps it will acquire "armor" in the form of an article which will make it inaccessible to the whim of bureaucrats.

In addition, one should remember that the law is not as important as the procedure for its application. One can proclaim, for example, the obligatoriness of the State Defense Order being executed by enterprises and organizations regardless of forms of ownership, but how is this provision to be combined practically with the market's legal declarations? Or tax breaks—one cannot get by here without an extensive explanation of the tax department. The law provides only general directions. Again, much will depend on what procedure will be established by the government for determining volumes, time periods of delivery and the list of material-technical resources subject to allocation. It is understandable that the bill is incapable of answering the question (and therefore does not do so) of what to do if a paralysis of nonpayments breaks up the domestic economy. Where then should one go with this law and what doors should be forced open?

I deliberately will not concretize the content of the bill. It will be possible to speak objectively about articles only after the first reading. We are saying that a law can be good to the extent to which it does not contradict the realities of life. And there are grounds to assume that the bill's developers are standing firmly on sinful soil and not getting carried away by speculative models. I also consider evidence of this to be the temperate optimism of Grigoriy Zhorin, who understands that the defense industry needs an entire package of laws, but who also is ready to thank God if He helps push through at least the one law—"On the State Defense Order."

Results of Duma Meetings With Senator Nunn

94UM0455A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Mikhail Pogorelyy: "Senators Apparently Do Recognize Need for 'Delicate Approach' With Russia"]

[Text]

Offer to Carry Out Russian-American Peacekeeping Force Training on U.S. Soil

On 31 May, leaders of the Duma defense and international affairs committees Sergey Yushenkov and Vladimir Lukin and Sam Nunn, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee chairman, called a press conference in which they described the results of a joint session held by the legislators of the two countries. These members of the legislative bodies listed the problems constituting subjects of common discussion and shared their views for resolving these problems. The dialogue, as pointed out by Sergey Yushenkov, was constructive as well as open.

One of the topics examined was the pressing one of the trade in weapons produced by our countries. Russia would like to have a clear indication that the U.S. does not stand in the way of our making exports to Third World countries. America believes in the aggressive approach, in that she intends to play by the rules of a free market, under conditions of stiff competition, something which as noted by Senator Sam Nunn exists even among the closest of allies. There is as yet also a lack of unity of views on the status of Russian Armed Forces units pursuing peacekeeping missions on the soil of CIS member countries.

Nonetheless, neither the State Duma members nor the U.S. senators did anything to dramatize whatever differences arose concerning their opinions and assessments. On the contrary, their feelings are fairly optimistic, and they intend, as borne out by their answers to a question put by the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, to meet regularly for the purpose of seeking points of agreement. Senator Dan Coats, one of the guests, jokingly remarked that the Americans are willing to have Russian parliamentarians "interfere" on Washington's Capitol Hill, for an exchange of opinions is useful to both sides.

An example of the above are the results of examining the situation arising in Russia relative to a plan to carry out a joint exercise of armed force peacekeeping units of the two states in the month of July. According to Vladimir Lukin, the American senators arrived at a keen understanding of the difficulties attendant to that, realizing that this is not a question of disinterest in cooperation, but rather one of delicate matters, such as national dignity and pride. Sam Nunn stated that, after completing the trip, he intends to submit a proposal for

carrying out the first of a series of joint exercises on U.S. soil, on a base located in California or Georgia.

Shirshov: R55 Trillion Is 'Subsistence Minimum' for Defense Budget

94UM04544 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Petr Karapetyan, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "The Federation Council Proposed To Increase Defense Appropriations. It Is Up to the Duma To Decide"]

[Text] At a closed session on 2 June the Federation Council adopted, as a basis by an overwhelming majority of votes, the Decree: "On the Course of Forming the 1994 Federal Budget."

It was recommended to the State Duma that defense expenditures be increased up to R55 trillion, of which R12 trillion is for arms procurement, up to R5.5 trillion for RDT&E, and up to R8 trillion for capital construction. It was recommended that expenditures for upkeep of the Armed Forces be reduced from R28 to 25.8 trillion.

Thus, the Federation Council proposed to the State Duma that the defense budget be increased by R18 trillion.

Commenting on this decision at the request of a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Petr Shirshov, chairman of the Federation Council Security and Defense Committee, directed attention to the fact that 55 trillion is that subsistence minimum which permits keeping the Army and military-industrial complex from collapse. As a comparison, 55 trillion do not make up even a third of the defense item of the 1994 U.S. budget.

Against the background of these calculations, some politicians' assertions about excessive appetites of the Army and military-industrial complex sound unconvincing. Meanwhile, even with 55 trillion there will be no fat, as is customarily said in such cases.

The decree is viewed rather critically by certain heads of administrations. In a talk with journalists about expenditures for military capital construction, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Governor Boris Nemtsov came out in favor of creating personal accounts that are closed for consumption expenditures, with funds for individual construction transferred to them. According to his estimates, 400,000 officers would be able to build themselves "decent houses" for R8 trillion.

Common sense must win out in the argument about R18 trillion, and I will give the reminder that it was proposed to reduce initial appropriations for defense by that much. The Federation Council is recommending that the State Duma not increase, but restore the amount of the "subsistence minimum" for the Army that was proposed in drawing up the budget message. Of course, there can be divergences of views, but a place also must be found

for compromises. Judging from the familiar statements of its chairman, Vladimir Shumeyko, and the reaction of deputies to the decision to cut off the defense item of the federal budget, the Federation Council will stand its ground firmly.

It is important in itself that the Federation Council position is clear to the State Duma on the eve of the second reading of the 1994 draft federal budget.

In a situation where President Boris Yeltsin, Government Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin and the Federation Council unequivocally came out in favor of a defense budget of R55 trillion, the State Duma also finally has to settle on its choice.

Probably now Duma deputies should take into account that they assume a special responsibility for possible consequences of their decision.

In the final account it is not a question of the Army's interests, but of the interests of the state, of Russia.

Media 'Fantasies' About Army Reform Rebutted

PM2106080194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jun 94 pp 1, 3

["Polemical Notes" by Anatoly Dokuchayev of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Military Reform: Truth and Fantasies"]

[Text] Recently the Russian Army and its leadership have found themselves the subject, so to speak, of very biased press attention. Analysts, political scientists, journalists, and sometimes simply hacks who like to speak out about anything have been conducting a targeted critical "bombardment." The thrust of the media salvos is that the situation in the Army is quite appalling, and the reforms are not progressing at all.

Why are they not progressing? Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain an answer to this question even after careful study of the many critical articles relating in one degree or another to this problem. Perhaps some of the plans are not being fulfilled? Is the Blueprint for the Organizational Development of the Armed Forces elaborated by the Defense Ministry not being implemented? Or maybe political scientists' forecasts have not been borne out and some of them are feeling aggrieved? Questions, questions, questions.... And here is another one. Is the situation really so bad in our country with regard to military organizational development?

Even a cursory analysis of what has been done over the last two years (the Russian Army is a little over 2 years old) refutes this. As does the end result—the Russian Armed Forces, despite many extremely painful problems, are combat-capable and on the whole ensure the fulfillment of the tasks confronting them. No, I am not talking about the assessment which the president made in his message to the Federal Assembly at the start of this year, although that is important in itself. I am talking

about something else. About the actual combat readiness of units and formations. At the time of writing Russian battalions were performing peacemaking functions in Yugoslavia in accordance with international pledges. Units of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division were taking part in protecting and defending the Tajik-Afghan border, and our subunits were between the warring sides in the Dniester region, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. There are 16,000 Russian servicemen in "trouble spots." And they are dealing with them.

The results of the winter training period attest that other units and formations of the General-Purpose Forces, which are being qualitatively transformed, are also combat-capable. The Mobile Forces which are being created as a new Armed Forces' interbranch operational-strategic formation are giving them a new face. Practical steps have already been taken today. Work to bring up to strength the units and formations that, when necessary, will be transferred from region to region and to provide them with arms and materiel has been started in the Airborne and Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces, and the Navy.

But what has not been done? Perhaps some important fruitful ideas have not been implemented?

A few years ago the General Staff began work on a new table of organization structure for the Armed Forces—a subject about which a great deal has been and is being said. This is already coming into being. The troops of the North Caucasus and Leningrad Military Districts have already been partly switched to a corps/brigade structure. If there is anything to be said here, it is merely to ask whether we are not being too swift to abandon combined arms army formations and formations of the division type. After all, in certain spheres divisions are simply irreplaceable, as experience shows. They have greater firepower than brigades and can conduct combat operations for several days. In short, what had long been advocated is being put into effect.

Other "drastic" reformers reduce all innovative work exclusively to switching the Army to a professional footing. Here too there are real shifts—the contract method of manpower acquisition is now a permanent feature in the Russian Army. As is well known, over 160,000 professionals are now serving as soldiers and sergeants, and another 150,000 contract personnel will be recruited in 1994, including over 14,000 women.

We have looked at just a few aspects of military reform, but even they graphically demonstrate that the reforms in the Army, for all the difficulties and contradictions, are nevertheless making clear progress. At any rate the pace of reform in the Army is in no way lagging behind the reforms in society in general. On the contrary, many spheres of military reform are being retarded precisely by the fact that the appropriate economic, political, and legal preconditions have still not been created and that the potential of the state, which is in profound crisis, is unfortunately extremely limited.

So why then are there such harsh assessments? Why do some newspapers often paint such a negative picture of the Army? Why are the honor and dignity of Russian officers often nonchalantly sullied?

Analysis of many articles devoted to military reform in civilian publications automatically suggests that the reform itself and the problems of the Armed Forces are a matter of indifference to the authors. They are something like auxiliary material for some totally different purposes.

For instance, take the following quite common thesis: A civilian should be appointed as soon as possible to the post of defense minister, otherwise there will be no reform. The arguments here consist of allusions to Western experience, and also contentions regarding the need for civilian control over the Armed Forces.

There is no question that civilian control is an important problem. But it is far more serious and far broader than simply the question of whether the minister has epaulets or not. Epaulets are rather a formality. In certain conditions a civilian could develop into a dictator, while a general's rank is certainly no obstacle to democratic attitudes and openness to society. Incidentally, that same Western experience provides much confirmation that military men often make very strong democratic politicians....

Clearly, it is more accurate to speak not of civilian but of political control over the Armed Forces. This includes presidential control, parliamentary control, collaboration between Army structures and various social organizations, and much else besides. This whole system has already taken shape in many respects today and is continuing to emerge.

And as for epaulets... Well, there probably will come a time when a civilian occupies the post of defense minister in our country, as in the United States or the FRG, although I personally am opposed to this—Russia has its own traditions. But is this the most urgent question today? For the sake of purely formal changes is it possible to disregard both, so to speak, the mentality of our military, who will scarcely find it easy to accept simply "some guy in a suit coat," and the clear absence of the preconditions for this in the political sphere itself? Have we not already suffered a lot of grief as a result of incompetence? Do we have plenty of readymade, full-fledged civilian candidates for defense minister? Remember how the notorious Galina Starovoytova was suggested quite seriously as minister. Imagine what the situation with regard to our Army and our defenses would be today if that had happened?

Political interests are usually what lies behind this. As they do behind other proposals for the drastic reform of the Defense Ministry and the Army in general. For instance, what is the worth of the maxim that a structure, in other words the Army, cannot reform itself, but military reform today has been left in the hands of the military.

Excuse me, but what is the point in airing a false premise in the newspapers and then chewing it over? The Army is indeed not reforming itself. Evidence? Certainly. Was it the military department that elaborated and adopted the laws by which people in uniform are guided today? And what about the military doctrine? Many state structures worked on it, beginning with the country's Security Council. Take the Blueprint for the Organizational Development of the Armed Forces. It was approved by the President. Or the recruitment of contract personnel. This has been and is being carried out on the basis of the edicts of the head of state and depends on the funding allocated by the government. Perhaps the military ratify the defense budget? That is not the case. The general military regulations are also the President's prerogative. A big scandal recently erupted in the press about the new uniform—apparently the military are wearing illegal uniform that has not been approved. An investigation was made. It turns out that the uniform is legal. Furthermore, it had long been planned with the aim of simplifying certain elements, making it cheaper, and making it more modern and attractive.

In short, military reform involves active participation by the president, parliament, government, Security Council, other state structures, and even...social organizations. Even the church is taking part in it. Yes, it is true that the leadership of the Armed Forces and military specialists and scientists play a great role in elaborating and implementing all the legal acts, programs, and blueprints. But how could that be otherwise? We cannot involve generals from abroad.

Anyhow, what is so bad about the military implementing military reforms? The main thing is that they introduce innovations that benefit the country's defenses and give the Army a modern face, the face of the army of a democratic state. Incidentally, all our Russian reforms in the defense sphere have been associated with the names of military figures. Milyutin's reforms. Rediger's reforms. Frunze's reforms.

It transpires that the military are not the point. It is just that every drastic proposal for the drastic reform of the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces as a whole and every maxim aired in the press, I repeat, often stems from political interests and nothing more.

I think even the authors of these and similar "fantasies" are perfectly well aware of the shakiness of their positions and scarcely seriously expect anyone to be guided by their conclusions. They are probably pursuing a different aim: to weaken from time to time the military leadership's position in resolving state questions—at the time when the military budget is being adopted, for instance. Or at a time when the political situation is deteriorating and there is social tension. If this is so, and I believe that this is precisely the case, then such articles are actually attempts to throw a monkey wrench in the works of the reforms that the "reformers" are ostensibly advocating.

Other experts, analysts, and journalists choose a "subtler" angle of attack on the Army—the real reform of the Armed Forces, regarding it as "fundamentally incorrect," "destructive of the homeland's Army," and so on.

The target of the attacks is primarily the Mobile Forces, though only yesterday the process of their creation was loudly welcomed by everyone without exception. Today the tone is different. Already some people have proclaimed: "Mobile Forces? Are they designed to perform gendarme functions?" Others seek simpler grounds for criticism—our Defense Minister is from the Airborne Forces, so he personally is championing expansion of the Airborne Forces. The criticism is bald, so to speak, and for some reason the authors do not bother with even the most modest analysis. What prompted the Armed Forces leadership to create them? What principle forms their foundation? Detailed answers to just these questions would allow the reader to draw his own conclusions. But no, what is the point of analysis, let alone serious analysis. But the truth is as follows.

Russia cannot afford to keep large troop groupings in all the strategic operational salients, and anyhow there is no need for this. What appear to be most dangerous to the state today are local conflicts, rather than large-scale war. But Russia (and it is capable of doing this) if necessary has to place a reliable barrier in the way of aggression from any direction. The principle of mobile defense which forms the basis for the creation of the troop groupings is called upon to play its main role here—it presupposes the existence of small but quite powerful forces ready for operational use wherever a real threat to the country's security arises. Incidentally, the USSR's military-political leadership, which adhered to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense, would have been bound in time to arrive at a similar principle for the structuring of defenses. This is less burdensome for the state, and it is effective so far as defense is concerned.

The Mobile Forces also come under attack from a different direction—it is claimed that they are being established to the detriment of the development of other branches of the Armed Forces, for instance, the Navy. There has been a whole series of articles in the mass media claiming that the present military leadership is virtually deliberately destroying the Navy. Articles of various calibers—ranging from claims that there is only one nuclear submarine on alert duty in the Russian Navy to articles attempting to encapsulate everything negative relating to our Navy.

What is the situation in reality? First a detail. At his 6 May briefing General of the Army Pavel Grachev disclosed some sensational news—each day 50 Russian submarines and surface ships are on alert duty and combat service at sea. But for some reason the mass media chose not to mention this. Now a few words about the state of affairs in the Navy. The situation today is indeed complex, but this is clearly not because of the creation of the Mobile Forces, it stems from the entire course of military organizational development in our

state in recent decades. The main efforts in the Soviet Union were concentrated on building warships, while the development of the infrastructure for their basing, support, and repair lagged behind. By 1992, that is, by the start of the creation of the Russian Armed Forces, about two-thirds of ships were in the final stage of their lifetime and in practice there was no system for basing large surface ships and heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers. Problems of repair and scrapping came to the fore. It takes sizable financial resources to solve them. But the Navy, like the other branches of the Armed Forces, unfortunately only receives a pittance.

If anyone is sounding the alarm about the state of affairs in the Navy it is the Defense Ministry leadership and the Navy command. There is some progress. Last year over 100 voyages were carried out. It is planned to achieve this level this year. It should be noted that alert duty and combat service at sea are carried out in accordance with the new system of views regarding the organizational development and use of the Navy—a system whose elaboration was affected by the substantial change in the geopolitical situation.

There is a great deal of speculation today over the reform of the Air Defense Troops. Some analysts have even hastened to declare that this branch of the Armed Forces too is being destroyed by the Defense Ministry leadership, disbanded, and so forth. What is the actual situation? All five existing branches of the Armed Forces, including the Air Defense Troops, are remaining until the year 2000. But it is also true that the theoretical basis for the further development of the branches of the Armed Forces is being improved today, and certain concepts are being verified in the course of large-scale strategic exercises involving troops. The facilities that needed to receive air defense cover are also being reviewed. The Air Defense Troops will be reduced to the optimum level by removing surface-to-air missile systems from secondary defended installations.

There are also difficulties in the organizational development of the Russian Air Forces, and this too is giving some of our "supporters" grounds for attacking the Army. But organizational development is under way.... The complex process of the redeployment of units on Russian territory that is now nearing completion is being carried out simultaneously with profound reform. The organizational structure of the Air Force is changing. Two new aviation commands have appeared—front-line aviation, and also the reserve and cadre training. New aviation groupings have been set up in the northwest, west, and southwest salients. Two air armies have "sprung up" in theaters that were not equipped from the aviation viewpoint. At the same time the total number of aviation formations has decreased from 15 to nine. Overall, the strength of the Air Force has decreased by 20 percent.

There is progress in another sphere—the military technical sphere. Today aviation regiments are being

rearmed with more modern equipment, which certainly gladdens everyone who cares about our Army.

On the whole the Russian Air Force, in the assessment of the Defense Ministry leadership, for instance, is capable of resolving the tasks that constitute its mission in collaboration with other branches of the Armed Forces. And this assessment is not a mere inference by our high-ranking generals. It is based on the results of the series of major exercises held in 1993-1994 involving the use of aviation units, the in-flight refueling of large numbers of aircraft, the launch of highly accurate aviation missiles, and the control of Air Force forces and systems from airborne control centers.

Of course, dozens of unsolved problems in the Air Force could be mentioned. For instance, the flying time of pilots of fighter and ground-attack aircraft remains a bottleneck. There are many reasons for this—the lack of airfield facilities, the shortage of fuel, and so forth. At the same time, as the experience of exercises shows, Russian pilots are capable of delivering highly accurate strikes, including from cloud cover.

I would also like to mention the following point. Some experts are worried and others, as the esteemed reader will have realized, angered by the fact that the branches of the Armed Forces are being reduced. But not all of them feel this way. There are many analysts who immediately say: "The Army is big, but it is not being downsized," "the military do not know the strength of the Armed Forces," "it is time to start cutting the Army," and so on in a similar vein.

What can I say about this? As the Defense Ministry leadership has repeatedly stated, a planned reduction in the strength of the Armed Forces is being carried out today—in 1993 alone it was cut by more than 260,000 men. Sometimes you hear the figure: There are 3 million military in the country. Specialists are aware that this figure relates not only to the Army, but also to other "power" structures. Sometimes military leaders themselves give the Army's strength without explaining whether this is the authorized strength, the roll call strength, or the actual strength. Some commentators see no difference between these. And so you get comments like: "The military do not know the strength of the Armed Forces."

Since we are talking about reductions, I will note that not everything is simple here. First of all, sharp reductions are an overly expensive pleasure for the state. Furthermore, this process entails the solution of many other problems, the most acute of them being housing. Over 77,000 servicemen discharged into the reserve do not have a roof over their heads today. It is also necessary to decide how big the reductions should be. The former Supreme Soviet legislatively defined the strength of the Armed Forces as 1.5 million men. At the time parliamentarians explained that they were proceeding from "generally accepted" norms: The armies in the developed countries, they said, are usually no more than 1

percent of the country's population. Foreign experience it has to be said, should be taken into account. But does this formal percentage take account of Russia's specific features, its geopolitical position, the length of its borders, the density of its population? Calculations by General Staff specialists show that, even with implementation of the principles of mobile defenses, the strength of the Army should be around 2 million men. This strength will make it possible to create troop groupings capable of responding adequately to any increase in the military threat in a particular region by transferring mobile components there.

Yes, the reforms are proceeding with difficulty, sometimes painfully, but painstaking daily work to improve the Army is continuing. In the immediate future, during 1994 and 1995, it is planned to complete the formation of the Armed Forces and to create the basis for their profound transformation. In particular, it is planned to create the Mobile Forces, to continue the creation of troop (force) groupings and the military infrastructure, and to complete the withdrawal of troops to Russia's territory. The plans also include a further switch to the mixed principle of manpower acquisition for units and formations and the transition from a predominantly army- and division-based forces structure to a corps and brigade structure. Full-scale comprehensive studies will be carried out to substantiate the strength, combat composition, and structure of the Armed Forces for the period after 1995.

A remark by General of the Army Grachev that is often quoted is: "We have succeeded in halting the sharp decline in combat readiness and military discipline among the troops. Servicemen's morale makes it possible to resolve the set tasks." It is quoted and presented ironically. What an achievement—it has proved possible to halt the sharp decline in combat readiness. Yes, this is an achievement, and a great one, as is recognized by everyone who is very familiar with the former and the present state of affairs among the troops and who knows the constant shortage of funds and the masses of other extremely complex problems. Incidentally, today it is time to say to the military leadership: Don't spur on the reforms so sharply, this is all too complex and difficult a job.

Look at the Blueprint for the Organizational Development of the Armed Forces (an unclassified document), and you will see, dear reader, the face of our Army by 1995 and the year 2000: a modern face. The main aim is to create qualitatively new Armed Forces according with the demands of the present military-political situation in the world and the real extent of the military danger to Russia. But the implementation of any provision of the blueprint requires not merely efforts on the part of the Armed Forces military leadership and the entire officer corps, but also efforts by the whole state and society. And here straightaway is a line from the blueprint—"reforming the structure of the Armed Forces."

What does reforming the structure of the Armed Forces mean? It is not a matter of shuffling a deck of cards. It is not a matter of drawing a new diagram. It is not a matter of drawing up a new document. It is a terribly complex and difficult job spanning many years and an extremely costly measure. Finally, it is the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in uniform and of those who work in the defense sphere.

The first stage—the elaboration of the blueprint itself—is not easy in itself, although for some reason certain analysts and critics do not think so and constantly hand about words like "I believe" and "I see the structure of the Armed Forces as follows." Certainly, everybody is entitled to have and to express their own viewpoint. But anyone who is concerned for their reputation and respectability should, in my view, put a period after the words "I believe." This is not merely superficial, it is very superficial.

The options for the structure of the Armed Forces that have been elaborated today by the Defense Ministry's main military scientific centers (I emphasize, not by individuals but by collectives of military professionals such as, for instance, the General Staff Military Academy) are not being implemented straight away but are being verified at various command staff games, exercises, training sessions, and so forth. For any error in this sphere could entail the breakdown of the existing defensive system, the expenditure of trillions of the people's rubles, and disruption to the lives of hundreds of thousands of people in uniform.

Of course, if you are not concerned about the country's security, if you are not cost-conscious, and if you portray people in uniform as mere cogs and chess pieces, in theory you can announce very striking changes in the Army every month and report that "considerable heights have been scaled in the course of military reform." But only adventurists could venture to do such things.

And why is nobody considering the following question: Is it possible at all to reform the Army, such a complex mechanism, when you have no money in your pocket? Of course not, if you regard the enhancement of the combat readiness and combat capability of units and formations as the main aim of the military reform. So why is it precisely the people who shout loudest about the absence of reforms in the Army who are voting in parliament today against granting the Armed Forces not only any money to carry out those reforms but even against providing, so to speak, a "subsistence income"? All the indications are that mercenary political calculations are the driving force here: "The worse the situation in the Army is, the more unstable society is. And therefore the better chance I have in the question of power."

Let us return once again to the question of contract personnel. In itself the number of contract personnel will not increase combat readiness. Why is that? Quality in the human resources and morale on the part of the

important, etc. etc. needed. And these companies depend directly on the market, the volume of business and on the state's potential to develop it. It is clearly state earmarked business plans for the recruitment of professionals. Just as much it can be this year. But this is not just a matter of money.

Do the respected units in military enterprises, they know that the most important thing for those who work with contract personnel is to have them in the units sometimes. Why? The Army, the state sometimes cannot deliver on its commitments. And the reasons for this are well known. In some regions professionals do not receive their wages for two or three months. Some payments are allocated for the leasing of housing. The serious problems could be continued. And so, I am afraid we may find those who have already earned the "combat rank" and who are willingly going to service in "peacekeeping spots" and "trouble spots."

Costs of the money. Officers of the General Staff and the commands of the branches of the Armed Forces say, and we will agree with them, that the personnel in the year 2000 as planned. But unfortunately, respected critics and analysts unfortunately. At present only 15 percent of servicemen are professionals.

What else is such an indisposition would require of equipment and arms, and the infrastructure. All this also requires colossal funding. As the commander reform assuming, I repeat that its main aim is aimed to be to increase the Armed Forces' common readiness rather than desire to them.

Certainly, analysis of the progress of the military reform must proceed in the broadest scale. Certainly, the successful advance of military reform is helped by objective critical articles. But the authors of various opinions, especially those who reform, absolutely everything as they see fit—no one can only marvel at their flight of fantasy should also remember the following points—unfair criticism democratizes public opinion. A fair, honest and selfless serving the homeland, but Russia and a painful blow to military reform. And unscrupulous speculation is doubly harmful.

MIG-29s Going to India

24 MAY 1994. Moscow. (APASS) 11 ZIT ZIT in Russian. 1 Jun 1994.

[Unassigned article: "MIGs for India"]

[Text] DEBHH. 31 May. (ITAR-TASS). Russia is to provide the Indian Air Force with the first lot of MIG-29M fighter-jet/bombers in the near future under the terms of a contract calling for selling to India 50 of these units and six MIG-29UB (combat training) types costing a total of 25 billion rupees (about 780 million dollars). This was disclosed here by high-level Indian sources. According to these sources, MIG shipments will be initiated as early as this summer. The aircraft will effect

its introduction (only) to meet the tactical demands of the Indian Air Force since these are typically used to perform intercept and strike tasks and not ground targets which is an extremely deep sea.

Sergey Anisimov, the chief representative of the state company Roscosmos, made a contribution to the efforts of IJAR-TASS correspondent stating that the Russian Air Force had dispatched to the Indian Air Force 100 MIG-29M fighters with its own air base. The MIG-29M is a 4th generation fighter with a maximum speed of 2,800 km/h and a range of 3,000 km. It is equipped with a powerful engine, a high-altitude cruise missile and a high-speed delivery system. In September 1993, the first MIG-29M was delivered to the Indian Air Force. However, S. Anisimov expressed the hope that a large number of MIG-29Ms will be made in India. The Indian Air Force is the largest in the world.

Russian military cooperation has definitely been on the rise in the last few months. In the last years of a new decade, in the middle of May, the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that the MIG-29M is a 4th generation fighter with a maximum speed of 2,800 km/h and a range of 3,000 km. It is equipped with a powerful engine, a high-altitude cruise missile and a high-speed delivery system. In September 1993, the first MIG-29M was delivered to the Indian Air Force. However, S. Anisimov expressed the hope that a large number of MIG-29Ms will be made in India. The Indian Air Force is the largest in the world.

Expedition To Seal Forward Section of KOMSOMOLETS

24 MAY 1994. Moscow. (APASS) 11 ZIT ZIT in Russian. 1 Jun 1994.

[Article by] KRASSAVY A ZVEZDA correspondent Ivan Stravinsky. "KOMSOMOLETS" Nuclear Submarine Sinks. Sinks. Sinks. MIG-29M.

[Text]

Russian MChS Collegium Holds Open Session on Expedition to "KOMSOMOLETS" Submarine Sinking Site

In compliance with an RF Presidential Order and a decree issued by the government of the Russian Federation, the Russian MChS (Emergency Ministry) is to provide supervision for the period 15 May to 15 August 1994 in the planning of an expedition to the site of the 1993 accidental sinking in the Norwegian Sea of the "KOMSOMOLETS" nuclear submarine, which has aboard a nuclear reactor and two torpedoes armed with nuclear warheads.

The greatest potential danger related to radiation in the ecological situation in the Norwegian Sea is posed by the two torpedoes each carrying 3.25 grams of plutonium 239. The actual danger is associated with the possibility

that corrosion may lead to the release of plutonium into the sea. The most pessimistic forecast specialists can make is the possibility of such an occurrence in the end of 1995-1996.

The above being the case, the expedition's purpose consists of sealing the submarine's forward section, monitoring the environment for radiation leakage, and maintaining checks on the technical condition of the craft.

The cost of the abovementioned operations will amount to 4.625 billion rubles and 4.1 billion dollars. According to the MChS leadership, the government of the Russian Federation is to provide all the funding.

Technical project development is to be accomplished under a contractual arrangement with the TsKB [Central Design Bureau] Rubin, with the participation of a number of scientific research institutions of the RAN [Russian Academy of Sciences], the MO [Ministry of Defense], and industrial organizations.

Expedition operations will involve the use of the research vessel "Academician Mot. Keldysh," which will be equipped with the Mir-1 and Mir-2 apparatus, and a ship belonging to the Ministry of Defense's GUNiO [Main Directorate for Navigation and Oceanography], which will transport equipment and expedition personnel from Murmansk to the site of operations.

Scientific and technical aspects of the work will be handled by the Main Administration for Operations in Seas and Water Bodies, Russian Emergencies Ministry, with the participation of specialists from a Ministry of Defense TsNII [Central Scientific Research Institute] and from 40 Ministry of Defense GNIIs [state scientific research institutes] on a contractual basis.

STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Nontargeting of Missiles Said To Enhance International Security

94UM0451B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Colonel Anatoliy Belousov, editor, Combat Training and Troop Life Department: "Our Missiles No Longer Threaten the United States and Great Britain, but Their Combat Readiness Is Preserved"]

[Text] This event can be called historical without exaggeration. For dozens of years, since the very origin of nuclear missile weapons, the world constantly has been in the sights of the nuclear button, so to speak. The missiles of countries possessing these weapons were aimed not only at each other, but also, it must be assumed, at important strategic and industrial targets, lines of communication... in short, at you and me.

Then, in accordance with understandings recorded in the Moscow Declaration of Presidents of the Russian Federation and United States of 14 January 1994 and in the Joint Declaration of the President of the Russian Federation and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 15 February 1994, the heads of the three countries made the decision to issue necessary instructions about nontargeting of strategic nuclear missiles under their respective command.

Implementation of this understanding by the Russian Federation signifies that day to day control of nuclear forces now is exercised based on the fact that the United States and Great Britain are not enemies of the Russian Federation and not one of our more than one thousand missiles in silos, on submarines and on mobile missile systems is aimed any longer against any targets on the territory of the United States and Great Britain.

It is hardly necessary to mention how much this step strengthens mutual and international security and follows the channel of fundamentally new relations of strategic partnership among our countries and of their practical cooperation in the military-political sphere. The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement which was disseminated states that this important step will open the path to further steps on a bilateral and multilateral basis in the interests of strengthening trust, stability and predictability in strategic nuclear arms. The document expresses the hope that the other nuclear powers also will take this path.

But what does implementation of a regime of nontargeting of missiles signify in practice? And is it necessary to be on constant alert status in that case? Will not the combat readiness of missile units suffer from this? These simple questions cannot help but occur to people who are not too familiar with the specifics of strategic nuclear forces. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA repeatedly has touched on these subjects, but today of course there is a need to return to this once more and cite the opinion of people who are informed, as they say...

Colonel General Stanislav Kochemasov, chief of the Main Staff of Strategic Missile Troops, says the following concerning the regime of zeroizing the missiles' missions:

"The problem of zeroizing depends on the missile systems' design features and will be resolved by us and by the American side for each type of missile in our own way. But common to all is an unequivocal reduction of the threshold of a surprise strike, since each side will have to perform a number of operational and technical operations to reestablish combat plans. This will take time, which politicians can use additionally for peaceful resolution of problems, should they arise."

One can add to what was said by the chief of the Main Staff that inasmuch as battle management systems of U.S. ICBM's and our ICBM's differ somewhat, their missiles will be targeted against uninhabited areas of the earth, while ours will have no specific targets.

With respect to combat readiness, specialists believe that zeroizing the missiles will not lower the combat potential of missile units. Special measures have been worked out and implemented to support the day to day activity and life of troops with nontargeted missiles.

Hundreds of specialists worked to ensure that the retargeting of missiles, which lowers nuclear danger in the world, was carried out within the time period set by the understandings—no later than 30 May 1994. Nevertheless, this act of good will and mutual trust does not relieve strategic nuclear forces of the responsibility of providing protection for the homeland and preserving stability on the planet. Therefore today, as always over the last 35 years, more than 20,000 missilemen are at duty stations around the clock.

GROUND TROOPS

Performance, Specifications of 'Tyulpan' 240mm Mortar

94U M04421 Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 1, 1994 pp 17, C4

[Article by A. Grigoryev, engineer, under rubric "You Ask, We Answer"]

[Text] "In VOYENNYE ZNANIYA, No 10, 1991, you included a photograph of an artillery piece on the back cover without supplying its explanatory caption. What kind of gun is this?"

"N. Mekhrengin (Kirov Oblast)"

We are correcting our error, albeit belatedly.

Powerful reinforcing mortars were required during the Great Patriotic War, and designing of 240-mm mortars along with 160-mm mortars began in 1942. Several design bureaus were doing this at the same time. Thus, the ZIS-27 (1942) and S-16 (1943) 240-mm mortars were designed under V. Grabin. In 1943 OKB-172 (where convicts worked) began working on the OB-29 240-mm mortar project. The OB-29 weighed 3,500 kg deployed, the mortar round weighed 125 kg, and the range of fire was 250-7,000 m.

During 1944-1945 B. Shavyrin's SKB [special design bureau] developed the most powerful model of a 240-mm mortar. Plant testing began back before the end of the war. Design deficiencies were found in the course of testing, and after they were remedied tests were renewed in 1947 and ended in 1949. Shavyrin's 240-mm mortar, designated M-240, became operational in 1950, at which time its range of fire was 8 km. In 1953 a special, more powerful propelling charge was developed for the M-240 which supported a range of fire of 9.7 km.

The M-240 240-mm mortar represents a rigid (without recoil mechanisms), breech-loaded, smoothbore system on a wheeled carriage, which fires a fin-stabilized projectile (mortar round). It consists of the following basic

parts: barrel with breech mechanism, breech piece, frame with shock absorber, mount with laying mechanisms and equilibrator, road wheels with suspension, trail with mechanism for transferring the mortar to a deployed and travelling position, base plate, and sights.

The barrel is a smoothbore tube secured in a trunnion band, which has the capability of tipping on trunnions to position the barrel for loading. The breech end is closed by an upward swinging breech mechanism.

The mount consist of two frames (upper and lower) hinged together. The lower is assembled on a two-wheeled axle. Elevating gear and an equilibrator accommodated between brackets of the axle and mount upper frame serve to lay the mortar for elevation. There is a spring suspension, and wheels are trolleybus type with foam rubber filling. The sight is a panoramic MP-46.

The mortar is loaded from the breech end, for which the barrel is placed in a horizontal position. A loading tray is mounted after the breech mechanism is opened. Five team members manually lift the mortar round, place it on the tray and ram it into the bore. Then it is lowered into the breech piece for firing.

The time for converting the M-240 from a travelling to a deployed position at a previously prepared firing position is 20-25 minutes, and the reverse takes 15-20 minutes. The mortar is moved by an ATL [light artillery prime mover] or other artillery prime mover at a speed up to 40 km/hr. Ammunition for it is in the body of the prime mover or in a motor vehicle.

In the late 1960's the gun part (model 2B8) of the 2S4 Tyulpan self-propelled mortar was designed on the basis of the M-240, for which the 2B8 240-mm mortar was mounted on a special chassis (Object 305). The barrel and ballistics were left unchanged in the 2B8 tipping part of the 2S4 Tyulpan self-propelled mortar. In contrast to the M-240, where all operations were manual, the 2B8 has a hydraulic system which completely replaces the team's difficult work of loading and laying the mortar. Only laying for deflection remained manual.

In contrast to the M-240, the loading angle for the 2B8 is around +63°. Mortar rounds are fed automatically onto the rammer guides from mechanical ammunition stowage in the chassis body. Two ammunition stowage areas hold 40 high-explosive or 20 rocket-assisted mortar rounds. In addition, loading can be done from the ground using a crane.

The V-59 diesel installed in the Tyulpan permitted developing a speed up to 62.8 km/hr on the highway and 25-30 km/hr on dirt roads.

Both mortars fire the F-864 high-explosive steel round weighing 130.7 kg, with explosives weighing 31.9 kg. The GVMZ-7 fuze has settings for instantaneous and delayed action. The F-864 round has five charges giving it a muzzle velocity of from 158 to 362 m/sec and a corresponding range from 800 to 9,650 m. The primer charge

is in the round's central tube and the other charges are contained in ring-shaped bags fastened to the central tube with silk cords. In addition to the F-864, it is possible to fire a rocket-assisted and a guided mortar round from the 2B8. According to western press information, "special charges" also were created for the M-240 and 2B8.

The following are the primary missions of 240-mm mortars:

- destroy sturdy field stone-wood-earth structures;
- destroy enemy personnel and equipment inaccessible to flat trajectory fire of artillery pieces

The latter quality makes the 240-mm mortar irreplaceable when operating, for example, in a city with high stone structures. Using the 1st and 2nd charges, the steepness of fall of the rounds becomes almost vertical, which ensures destruction of practically any target. The rocket-assisted round increases the range of fire, and the guided round selects and destroys point targets, including armored equipment.

Not one country in the world has adopted such powerful mortars in the postwar period. The present caliber of mortars of the United States, England, France and Germany does not exceed 120 mm.

Specifications and Performance Characteristics of 240-mm Mortars

	M-240	2S4
Caliber, mm	240	240
Tube length, mm/caliber	5,000/20.8	5,000/20.8
Mortar elevation when firing, degrees	+45, +80	+50, +80
Angle of deflection with:		
minimum angle of elevation, degrees	+/-18	+/-10
maximum angle of elevation, degrees	+/-39	+/-41
Weight of tube with breech mechanism, kg	726	1,100
Weight of gun part of self-propelled gun mount, kg	-	3,300
Weight of system deployed, kg	3,610	27,500
Rate of fire, rounds/min	1	0.8-1
Range of fire of F-864 round:		
minimum, m	800	800
maximum, m	9,650	9,650
Range of fire of rocket-assisted round weighing 228 kg, m		18,000
Sight	MP-46	MP-46M

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AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Operations of Su-25 Regiment in Tajikistan

94UM0443B Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 1, Jan 94 (signed to press 20 Dec 93) p 46

[Article by Dmitriy Grinvuk: "Rooks' Over the Pyandzh Again"]

[Text] Almost nothing is known about the fact that Russian Air Force units have been active in combat operations on the territory of Tajikistan. Here are the details. The 186th Ground Attack Instructor Regiment, based at Kakaydy Airfield in Uzbekistan at the junction of the Tajik, Afghan and Uzbek borders, is a component part of the Russian Federation Air Force Grouping. The regiment was formed on the basis of the Borisoglebsk Air

Training Center and the backbone of its flight personnel are very experienced instructor pilots (hence the regiment's name).

The appearance of instructor air regiments in the Air Force makeup is no accident. According to the new methodology of putting young pilots in formation, the main emphasis, in contrast to past times, is placed on air training centers in which pilots perfect flying skills obtained in schools and rehearse tactics of combat employment of equipment. The new level of flight personnel training demanded a new level of instructors: a combat pilot can be trained only by a mentor possessing combat experience. This was the basis for forming special instructor regiments.

The 186th Ground Attack Instructor Regiment is armed with Su-25BM and Su-25UB attack aircraft. Before restationing to Kakaydy, the regiment was covering Russian troops in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone. It was there that enormous depictions of the Russian flag appeared on the fins of many aircraft along with the red

stars inherited from the USSR, which permitted distinguishing the regiment's aircraft at least in some way from Georgian Air Force Su-25's of the same type—the only aircraft being produced there in Tbilisi.

The regiment rebased to Kakaydy on 24 July 1993 at the most critical moment on the border, after the death of 25 border guards in the 12th Border Outpost, when numerous well-armed detachments of rebels and Afghan mujahedin were proceeding over several crossings constructed across the Pyandzh into the interior of Tajikistan. In the first days the pilots flew several combat sorties each, dropping up to 80 tonnes of bombs a day. The standard combat payload consisted of six OFAB-250's and two R-60M air-to-air missiles for self-defense in a possible encounter with Afghan fighters, and also two suspended fuel tanks. The decisive actions of the ground attack pilots broke the course of events and permitted the border guard personnel and motorized riflemen to dig in firmly at the occupied positions.

Together with a group of Moscow Military District Air Force staff officers headed by Lieutenant-General of Aviation Nikolay Antoshkin, which was making an inspection trip, your correspondent flew in to Kakaydy Air Base in a period of relative lull. Our Il-76MD also delivered another shift of pilots and technicians from Buturlinovka, the Borisoglebsk Air Training Center airfield. As already mentioned, by agreement with the government of Uzbekistan, the 186th Ground Attack Instructor Regiment is operating from its territory. Because of the absence of national cadres and the break in economic ties, the Republic Armed Forces are in an extremely difficult situation. Russian servicemen who arrived encountered a mass of problems: long-range and short-range navigation systems were not operating at the airfield. The Uzbek Air Force 115th Guards Fighter Regiment based at Kakaydy, previously regarded as one of the best, is experiencing a great shortage of technical flight personnel. Therefore along with conducting combat operations, personnel of the Russian Air Force regiment had to restore airfield equipment and guard the entrusted equipment and ammunition under very difficult conditions of Central Asian heat, sand storms, and a shortage of potable water and of adjusted everyday life—air conditioners are absent and the food ration is monotonous.

High combat proficiency helps avoid losses in people and equipment while inflicting considerable damage on the enemy. The following fact attests to the pilots' proficiency and to the Su-25's combat capabilities: with one pass at the target, the positions of a DShK [Degtyarev and Shpagin heavy machinegun] antiaircraft battery, Major Vdovin destroyed three out of four machineguns with a bomb strike. In the last days of September it was learned that several pilots headed by regimental commander Colonel Aleksey Golovin, an Afghan War veteran, were recommended for state awards at the initiative of the ground troops command in Tajikistan.

The majority of servicemen of the 186th Ground Attack Instructor Regiment believe that by covering the border on the Pyandzh River they are defending the borders of Russia and of Commonwealth countries. If they were to leave here, it is fully likely that in a short time interval they will have to fight the very same enemy, only several hundred kilometers to the north.

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Detailed Description of Tu-160 Subsystems

94UM0443A Moscow KRYLYA RODINY in Russian
No 1, Jan 94 (signed to press 20 Dec 93) pp 1-3

[Conclusion of article by Vladimir Ilin and Mikhail Levin: "Practically the Only Strategic Aircraft (Tu-160)"; beginning of article in KRYLYA RODINY, No 12, 1993]

[Text] The aircraft is controlled in pitch using an all-moving stabilizer, in roll by flaperons and interceptors, and in yaw by an all-moving fin.

There is an automatic system for restriction and warning about moving to threshold regimes.

The Tu-160 is equipped with a hose/cone aerial refueling system. When not in use, the boom retracts into a compartment ahead of the pilots' cockpit in the fuselage nose. Initially, when Il-78 and 3M tanker aircraft were equipped with an aerial refueling system having a heavy cone, a massive "firing" boom was installed in the bomber, but since the appearance of lighter cones, the Tu-160 has had lightweight booms of a simpler design since 1988.

An option also examined at Air Force insistence was that of outfitting the aircraft with a nonretractable boom accommodated in the slightly upturned fuselage nose (as in the 3M), but such a solution subsequently was rejected.

The bomber is equipped with a sighting and navigation system supporting automatic flight and combat employment. This includes a number of systems and sensors which permit engaging ground targets regardless of time of day, region or weather conditions.

An inertial navigation system, astronavigation system, satellite navigation system, multichannel digital communications system and developed ECM system are installed. The latter permits detecting enemy radars in a wide band and conducting active and passive jamming.

The navigation and fire control radar mounted in the fuselage nose has a parabolic antenna and is capable of detecting large naval and ground radar-signature targets at a great distance. There is an electro-optical bombsight supporting high-accuracy bombing under daylight conditions and with a low level of illumination.

The tail cone accommodates numerous pods with decoy flares and chaff. A thermal direction finder which detects

enemy missiles and aircraft approaching from the rear hemisphere is in the extreme rear of the fuselage.

The overall number of digital processors aboard the aircraft exceeds 100. The navigator workstation is equipped with eight digital computers.

The pilots' cockpit is equipped with standard electromechanical instruments similar to those installed in the Tu-22M3 bomber, but the aircraft is controlled not with the help of the control yoke traditional for heavy aircraft, but by means of a "fighter" type of stick (the Tu-160 largely is obligated for the control stick's appearance to Reshetnikov, who helped convince numerous "conservatives" of the benefit of using it on a heavy bomber).

The Tu-160 armament is located in two large fuselage bays and may include a wide assortment of guided missiles, guided and free fall bombs, as well as other weapons both with nuclear as well as conventional filling. This permits using the aircraft against essentially all types of ground and naval targets.

Missile armament includes up to 12 Kh-55 cruise missiles created in the Raduga MKB [Design Bureau] and accommodated in two rotary launchers. The cruise missiles are for engaging stationary targets with preset coordinates, input to the cruise missile "memory" before the bomber takes off.

The Kh-15 aeroballistic missile may be included in the armament for engaging targets of no lesser range. An

antiship version of this missile with a radar homing system operating in the millimeter band and an anti-radar version with passive homing have been developed. Use of other types of advanced missile weapons also is possible.

Bomb armament of the Tu-160 bomber is viewed as a "second priority" weapon intended for engaging targets remaining after a first missile strike by the bomber. It also is accommodated in the weapons bay and may include various types of guided bombs, including the most powerful domestic munitions of this class—series KAB-1500 with a caliber of 1,500 kg.

The aircraft also can be equipped with free fall (including nuclear) bombs of various caliber, expendable cluster bomb dispensers, sea mines and other armament.

One possible area of employing the Tu-160 is to use it in the Burlak system intended for inserting light satellites into near-earth orbit. A need for such satellites may arise in the course of combat operations in case the enemy succeeds in destroying or substantially weakening the orbital grouping and the Baykonur and Plesetsk space launch facilities have been knocked out. In addition, Burlak has enormous potential for commercial use for launching domestic and foreign satellites for the most varied purposes.

The system consists of the Tu-160 platform aircraft and a solid-propellant cruise missile being created in the Raduga MBK [sic; probably MKB].

Burlak Aircraft System Characteristics

Weight of payload to be inserted into low circular orbits, kg	
polar	300-500
equatorial	500-700
Weight of payload to be inserted into circular orbits 1,000 km high or elliptical orbits (perigee 200 km, apogee 8,500 km), kg	
polar	50-150
equatorial	120-220
Maximum payload dimensions, m	1.3 x 1.2 x 1.2
Volume of payload bay, m ³	1.75

Employing the aircraft system precludes the need for creating new costly ranges and ground launch complexes or leasing existing ones. It supports formation of an orbit in practically any plane and launches from any place on earth suitable from the standpoint of safety regardless of time of day and climatic and weather conditions. Compared with traditional launch vehicles, specific energy costs for launching an equivalent payload are reduced by 2-3 times and the unfavorable effect on ecology is diminished.

Equipment for preparing the missile and system are autonomous and mobile and support prompt launch of a mission-specific payload.

Despite very major achievements of domestic designers in creating bombers, our country's Long-Range Aviation

has remained a very small component of the strategic nuclear triad for many years. When the START I Agreement was concluded in 1991, the USSR had 162 strategic bombers carrying 855 nuclear weapons, which was 8.3 percent of the overall number (10,271) of the USSR's nuclear weapons. Heavy bombers in the U.S. strategic forces always were given a substantially greater role: in that same 1991 the United States had 574 heavy bombers with 2,353 nuclear weapons (22.3 percent), i.e., aviation had approximately the very same weight as ICBM's, although it was behind submarine missile forces.

But the situation may change substantially in case of realization of the START II Treaty, which provides for a radical restructuring of strategic nuclear forces. This

inevitably will involve an increase in the role of heavy bombers in the country's defense system (by 2003 the limit for bombers will be 750-1,250 nuclear weapons, with 3,000-3,500 nuclear weapons overall).

While the main emphasis previously was placed on creating weapons intended for combating the main potential enemy, the United States, now various scenarios of armed conflicts are being examined, and it is not a nuclear "apocalypse" that appears most likely, but limited local wars. In this case Long-Range Aviation remains the only part of the strategic triad capable of universal employment (using both nuclear as well as conventional weapons), which significantly elevates its role.

The domestic and foreign press has noted that the Tu-160 presently is the most powerful strike aircraft in the world. One can become convinced of the soundness of these assertions by comparing it with the U.S. analogue, the Rockwell B-1B strategic bomber. The common feature of fourth-generation aircraft is the integrated aerodynamic configuration distinguished by the smooth joining of wing and fuselage, which because of its unquestionable advantages (increased aerodynamic efficiency, increased internal volumes, a decrease in the area flowed around and in radar cross-section) has become widespread in modern combat aviation. It also was adopted for many fighters of the 1970's and 1980's (Su-27, MiG-29, G-16, F/A-18). The closeness of requirements (possibility of penetrating enemy air defense at low altitude and transonic speed and at high altitude and supersonic speed while providing intercontinental flight range and a considerable combat payload) predetermined the choice for both aircraft of a variable-geometry wing supporting multiple-regime flight [mnogorezhimnost poleta].

But their similarity ends with these configuration features common to both aircraft. The Tu-160 is considerably heavier than the U.S. aircraft (maximum takeoff weight 275 t compared with 216 t of the B-1B) and possesses a much greater maximum load-carrying capacity (design weight of combat payload in weapons bays is 45 t as against 34 t for the B-1B).

A certain advantage of the Tu-160 in specific weight indicators of thrust-to-weight ratio also leads to better specifications and performance characteristics: it has a greater flight range (12,300 km compared with the B-1B's 10,400 km). It should be taken into account that the Tu-160 has a high supersonic flight speed at which it is capable of flying for a lengthy time, while the maximum Mach number for the B-1B is reduced to 1.25 because of the rejection of variable-geometry intakes and a decrease in the proportion (by weight) of titanium alloys in the construction from 21 to 17.6 percent.

In the assessment of Russian Air Force Commander P. S. Deynekin, expressed in a conversation with the authors, maneuverability and controllability characteristics of the B-1B and Tu-160 aircraft are approximately identical.

The "empty" B-1B (with a takeoff weight of around 150 t) in which Deynekin flew in the United States made sharp turns with up to a 40° bank and a steep climb and descent. But in the commander's words, it also would have been possible to fly a Tu-160 with an incomplete fuel load in a similar manner.

Advantages of the Tupolev aircraft were dictated by a number of its fundamental design features. In contrast to the B-1B, which uses a system of supplementary moving airfoil surfaces in the aircraft nose for damping elastic vibrations of the fuselage in the pitch plane when flying in a turbulent atmosphere, there is no need for such devices in the Tu-160. Increased rigidity of the aircraft's construction is achieved through a lesser elongation of the nose with developed wing root leading-edge extensions. Realization of an original wheel well configuration—without disturbing the fuselage's load-bearing unit, while in the B-1 the fuselage is greatly weakened (in the figurative expression of aircraft chief designer V. I. Bliznyuk, it is "cut in half" by the wheel compartments)—permitted getting by without using a supplementary electronic system. The increased resonance of joints for rotating the Tu-160's moving wing panels (the relative length of the center section beam is 0.25 with unfolded wing compared with 0.19 for the B-1B) reduces trim losses at transonic speeds as a result of a lesser shift of the center of aerodynamic pressure when reversing the wing. Use of an electro-remote control system in the Tu-160 provides a fundamental capability to reduce trim losses even more by reducing the aircraft's static stability.

In creating the Tu-160 and B-1B, designers were given the task of sharply reducing radar cross-section, the main indicator of radar signature. But while the United States sacrificed a number of very important performance characteristics for the sake of this (above all speed, which turned the bomber from supersonic to transonic), the Tupolev firm achieved similar results without "worsening" the aircraft. In contrast to the air intake with S-shaped baffles used in the B-1B, an ordinary variable-geometry intake was installed in the Tu-160, providing high characteristics in all flight configurations, and radar cross-section was reduced by using "low-signature" engines. A reduction in radar signature also is facilitated by a more "integrated" configuration (from a front view, the Tu-160's lines resemble the U.S. Northrop B-2 low-signature aircraft), a cockpit not extending beyond fuselage lines (in the B-1B it is situated above the wheel wells and forms a unique hump in the aircraft nose section), and an all-moving fin (the slot formed between the B-1B vertical tail and rudder provides an additional splash of reflected radar emission).

Armament of the bombers also differs substantially. The Tu-160 is capable of carrying a wide assortment of both nuclear as well as conventional munitions (guided and unguided). The presence of an optical bombsight provides high precision of high-altitude bombing. The B-1B presently is equipped only for delivering B-61 and B-83 nuclear free fall bombs. The SRAM short-range guided missile was removed from the armament since storage

periods of solid-propellant rocket motors had expired, and work on the SRAM II advanced missile stopped in 1991.

It has been written repeatedly that the B-1B is capable of carrying ALCM cruise missiles. In fact, tests were conducted confirming the possibility of accommodating such weapons on the aircraft, but as of the present time the B-1B bomber fleet does not have the necessary equipment permitting use of cruise missiles. (A large amount of additional funds, which the U.S. Defense Department does not have, is required to manufacture such equipment and install it in the aircraft.) Only in 1991 did the U.S. Air Force begin work to arm the B-1B with conventional 225 kg free fall bombs. The B-1B can perform only "carpet" bombing of areas because of the absence of an optical bombsight.

At the same time, the U.S. aircraft has more sophisticated cockpit instrumentation, particularly monochrome CRT indicators installed in front of each pilot, which makes flying the aircraft easier, especially in low-altitude flight.

Comparing the Tu-160 and B-1B, it is impossible to ignore the higher engineering professionalism and elegance of

design of the Tupolev aircraft, which favorably distinguish it from the Rockwell creation. Thus, the deflecting root sections of flaps, which provide smooth joining of the rotating and stationary parts of the wing, improve aircraft aerodynamics when flying at high speeds by performing the role of additional fins. In a cruising regime they form a smooth transition between wing surfaces, ideal from the standpoint of aerodynamics and radar signature. This elegant, clever solution contrasts with the cumbersome, "nonaerodynamic" system of joining used by the Americans and including hideous (from an aesthetic standpoint) deflecting panels and complicated and not very reliable seals. In general, in the authors' opinion, a unique "superiority complex" (in the good sense of this word) was displayed in creating the Tu-160, which formed in the best part of the engineering design corps of the OKB [Special Design Bureau] imeni A. N. Tupolev (a rather rare quality for our days).

The multiple-regime combat aircraft, harmoniously combining low signature with high performance characteristics and powerful defensive and offensive weapons, has good chances of "surviving" in the skies of the early 21st century. It is obvious that of all the strategic supersonic bombers created as of the present time, specifically the Tu-160 most approaches the ideal of such an aircraft.

Tu-160 Characteristics

Wingspan, m:	
flying at maximum speed	35.6
in cruising flight	50.7
in a takeoff and landing regime	55.7
Aircraft length, m	54.1
Height, m	13.2
Wheel track, m	5.4
Wheelbase, m	17.9
Length of engine nacelle (less wedge), m	13.78
Horizontal tail span, m	13.25
Maximum takeoff weight, kg	275,000
Maximum landing weight, kg	165,000
Fuel weight, kg	140,600
Maximum practical combat payload, kg	22,400
Maximum permissible weight of combat payload, kg	45,000
Maximum speed at 13,000 m in afterburning power conditions, with 65° wing sweep, km/hr	2,200
Maximum Mach	2.0
Service ceiling, m	15,000
Range on full fuel load down to minimum reserve with takeoff weight of 275,000 kg	12,300
Endurance, hrs	15
Maximum rate of climb, m/sec	60-70

NAVAL FORCES

Destroyer 'Neustrashimyy' To Participate in NATO 'BALTOPS-94'

94U M045 LA Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian ~ Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Maryukha and Valeriy Gromak, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Russia's Accreditation in NATO Exercises Is Becoming Traditional"]

[Text] BALTOPS-94 is the name of the NATO Allied Naval Forces exercise which began today in the southern Baltic and in which ships, submarines and naval aviation of 13 countries, including countries not in the Alliance, are taking part. The commander-in-chief Allied Forces Baltic Straits zone has overall direction of the exercise and the ship grouping is subordinate to the commander, U.S. Navy Destroyer Squadron 14.

Along with other countries for which participation in such exercises is new (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and to some extent Poland), Russia is represented relatively modestly in Baltic Operations-94. Nevertheless, the patrol ship Neustrashimyy, to which the exercise plan assigns a serious mission of taking American specialists aboard after they land on the water from an Orion aircraft, is the newest and one of the best ships of the Baltic Fleet.

According to a Russian Federation Navy Press Center report, in addition to interworking with U.S. special forces during the exercise, the ship will rehearse elements of joint maneuvering and communications, practice firing will be carried out against a naval target, and a rescue operation will be conducted. The participation of three submarines in the exercise also implies conduct of an ASW operation. Neustrashimyy already is the second Baltic Fleet ship to take part in NATO naval exercises. In the past year the patrol ship Bditelnyy was "sent on TDY" to BALTOPS-93 and successfully coped with the mission assigned.

The exercise, held annually for 22 years now, will last until 10 June.

The ships put to sea yesterday after a briefing and clarification of exercise details in the German port of Kiel. Our correspondent also set off for the exercise area aboard the Neustrashimyy. We intend to publish his detailed account in upcoming issues.

Navy Leaders Said To Ruin Sub Fleet but Go Unpunished

PM1606135794 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Jun 94 pp 1, 2

[Article by Captain First Rank (Retired) Ilya Kolton, candidate of technical sciences: "Military Secret: Evidence Will Surface—Top Secret Documents on the Status of Russian Naval Submarines"]

[Text] It is not the first time that this theme has been raised in the press. A whole host of articles in various mass media

sources have been devoted to the catastrophic situation in the Russian Navy and its level of combat effectiveness. The article by Captain First (Retired) Ilya Kolton is the culmination of this long history, which reveals not only the criminal negligence on the part of the Navy leadership in the matter of ensuring the combat effectiveness of Russian nuclear submarines, but also the monstrous bureaucratic red tape at all levels of power today.

In Place of an Epigraph:

If a wily and perfidious leadership, showing no consideration for the well-being of the fatherland, wanted, for its own gain, to reduce our Navy to the point of possible annihilation, even it could not place it in a position any more contemptuous or any more impotent than the one in which it is today.

Vasily Golovnin (1776-1831), Russian seafarer, participant in an around-the-world voyage, and, from 1823 onward, chief naval quartermaster.

The use in the 1950's of nuclear-powered devices on submarines by the United States and the USSR allowed them to conduct lengthy secret operations under water. It is this which predetermined their role as a nuclear missile carrier and became a component (the naval one) of strategic offensive arms. However, by the end of the 1960's, this key combat asset had been lost by our nuclear-powered submarines. The main reason—the unacceptable, if not criminal, negligence on the part of certain home-grown scientists, designers, and the Navy leadership—that is, all those who preside over naval shipbuilding—in respect of the problem of reducing the underwater noise levels of nuclear-powered submarines, their main detection factor.

On the other hand, the United States and the countries of NATO, applying the principle of complex acoustic design to their nuclear-powered submarines, which meant according absolute priority to the underwater noise level over all other combat characteristics (speed, depth of submergence, and so on), reduced the noise levels of their nuclear-powered submarines tens of times over and thus improved their detection range hundreds of times over [povisili v sotni raz dalnost vzaimnogo obnaruzheniya]. They developed a whole series of models of torpedoes and mines with acoustic self-guidance systems, plus a whole range of other important measures was implemented pertaining to combat our submarines on the basis of their high noise level.

As for us, knowing, as we did, from intelligence reports the direction in which the United States' submarine strategy was developing, we stuck with the old principles of submarine building expounded back in 1742 by Yefim Nikonov, who was the first person to create a "hidden vessel" and test its submergence and navigability under water in the River Neva.

Our guys, failing to alter the philosophy of submarine building since that time, as if out of bloody-mindedness continued to design noisy submarines. Breaching laws

and the methodology of testing, they fraudulently supplied and continue to supply the fleet—with the consent of the naval commander in chief—with unbattleworthy floating targets which are both unreliable and dangerous to use. In this way, the combat efficacy of the Navy has been brought to the level of the absurd.

We did not want a sensation on this subject in the open press. There was, after all, a real possibility of resolving this problem on a bilateral basis without humiliating the military-industrial complex, the Navy, and those who served and serve it faithfully. Indeed, 1990 even saw the conclusion of just such an alliance with Admiral F. Novoselov, deputy naval commander in chief for shipbuilding and weaponry, and we supported nuclear-powered submarine projects, but, clearly, this move did not fit into V. Chernavin's plans. So we were forced to enter into open discussion with V. Chernavin in the press, at times making use of officially classified information which, in point of fact, was really being kept secret from our only own people.

After this, we made repeated appeals to all state authorities, including the newfangled Russian Security Council (Yu. Sokolov, V. Rubanov, V. Manilov, Yu. Nazarkin, B. Ilin), with a single request: That we might be given a chance in their presence to defend the truth in honorable battle. However, even for these people, directly answerable under the Law "On Security" for the country's defense capability, this venture was unsuitable. Nobody from among the state officials noticed our pointed, revealing articles in newspapers and magazines, giving the impression that they had never read them. But then came the "first sign" which we had been patiently awaiting—V. Chernavin's article in PRAVDA 9 February this year entitled "Paper Boats in the Sea of Life." The former navy commander in chief came down angrily on the conclusion that "our nuclear submarines, the basis of the Navy's nuclear might and a component of the strategic nuclear forces, are a sham. They are merely a maneuver to show that our country does still have a combat capable fleet. We go to sea, churn up the waters in the ocean, but this is as effective as beating the air. Missile-armed submarines cannot in principle bear any combat significance or effect any combat service.... The Americans are hundreds of times superior in terms of detection range. The upshot is that they, secretly tracking our missile-armed submarines from the first to the last moment they are at sea, stick with them, as if they had a dog on a lead...."

In the article V. Chernavin described this, albeit bitter, truth as a "monstrous lie." But it is this bitter truth which has been communicated in the open press and in dispatches to the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR KGB since as far back as 1974 not only by me, a mere mechanical engineer who, in V. Chernavin's words, is unfit to discuss the problems of naval strategy, but also by admirals and top nuclear-powered vessel commanders with a conscience and a feeling of responsibility toward their people.

Incidentally, while V. Chernavin was floundering emotively in the airy "strategy" of conducting underwater warfare, submarine experts in the United States condensed actual underwater strategy to ensuring the secrecy of the actions of their own submarine forces, which was sufficient for our submarine forces to find themselves in the role of a blind and deaf boxer striving to win a fight against the invisible man.

Unlike V. Chernavin, Fleet Admirals G. Yegorov and N. Smirnov, Admiral N. Amelko, Vice Admirals R. Golosov, V. Kruglyakov, and Ye. Chernov, Captains First Rank A. Alekseyev, Yu. Beketov, A. Gorbachev, V. Zhukovskiy, V. Zaznobin, V. Loboshinskiy, G. Melkov, A. Khrapovich, and many others, bravely sought to extricate our submarine forces from this humiliating position, and to ward off the unprecedented damage being inflicted on the Navy, society, and the state as a result of huge accidents and catastrophes involving weaponry and military hardware. But in vain. They were prevented by V. Chernavin. They were distanced from vital naval affairs. Unfortunately, it is an old Russian custom that such people are needed only at times of war and extreme difficulty. K. Simonov put it well in a poem entitled "Aleksandr Suvorov": "In peacetime, we are like estranged sons, but in wartime we are all brothers together!" In times of peace, the people leading the dance are people like V. Chernavin. You didn't have to be a great strategist to organize the 1987 "spectacular"—the naval operation described by him in the article "Paper Boats in the Sea of Life," which, in his words, "...seriously worried the Pentagon and prompted questions of a highly pertinent nature in the U.S. Congress...."

It is clear to the submarine engineer and the schoolboy alike that this naval operation was designed to disinform. Judge for yourself. Five missile-armed submarines were earmarked to take turns carrying out alert duty at sea for one year. To fulfill the prescribed task, which was part of a plan to use on a rota basis one missile-armed submarine at a time, the naval commander in chief sent all five to sea at once. The question arises: How will the naval commander in chief carry out the task of defending Russia and the CIS countries from the sea for the other 80 percent of the year if the division's annual sortie quota for missile-armed submarines, and unreliable ones at that, is completely used up?

Let's cite a few excerpts from documents testifying to this very real state of affairs.

Top Secret: From a letter from Academician A.P. Aleksandrov and Fleet Admiral G.M. Yegorov to the USSR president:

"As practice has shown, over recent decades every one of our missile-armed strategic submarines has been under constant and clandestine surveillance affording a high level of readiness to destroy them on order, which leaves no grounds to believe it possible that the task of Russia's defense, even in restricted coastal regions of military action, can be effected."

Thus, in his article, V. Chernavin tries to mislead the public, and first and foremost the Russian Federation Security Council, by mentioning the apparently high combat potential of our naval strategic nuclear system. "The success of this operation meant a great deal in terms of my international prestige too. NATO strategists had to be aware, with the departure of the former commander in chief, Admiral of the Soviet Fleet S.G. Gorshkov, who did so much to bring our ships out into the expanses of the world ocean, that not only does his successor not intend to surrendering the positions acquired, but will play a new, more profound and more acute game."

The gravity of this stance is not only that V. Chernavin is concerned about his prestige in the United States and his own country all at once, but also fact that, to the detriment of the country's defense capability, he takes the urgency out of the problem of the struggle to increase the combat efficiency of the actions of our submarines.

Top Secret: From Security Ministry files (N. Golushko) to Russian Federation General Prosecutor V. Stepankov.

"The crux of the problem resides in the fact that the elaboration of areas of development of hydroacoustic complexes and self-guidance systems for underwater weaponry, appraisal of the effectiveness and principles of a decision on new designs for nuclear submarines, the elaboration of comprehensive programs for antisubmarine warfare, and, finally, the actual planning of combat operations involving calculations of the optimum force configuration, is directly linked with the need to have a precise knowledge of the characteristics of the noise levels of our own submarines and those of a probable opponent. Any distortion of information in this sphere will cause tremendous damage both in the matter of developing weapons and military hardware for the Navy and also in that of planning its combat activity and, ultimately, the country's defense capability."

To this day, V. Chernavin's objections to the introduction of proposals opening the way to ratifying START II without damaging the country's defense capability do not add up and dispel doubts about the objectivity of our conclusions on the point of this "activity" by V. Chernavin. After all, these proposals remove the deficiencies of the naval component of START II in the shortest possible space of time and with minimum material outlay. They were supported by the submarine engineers of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, scientists, and designers, and they were substantiated by the results of interdepartmental reconstructions and tactical exercises in the period from 1982 through 1986. The experience gained was analyzed by the departments, and in 1985 it was approved at the Navy Military-Technical Council and recommended for introduction on nuclear submarines. However, through the efforts of the Navy commander in chief, everything sunk into oblivion.

Top Secret: From Security Ministry files (N. Golushko) to Russian Federation General Prosecutor V. Stepankov.

"At the same time, it should be noted that Navy Commander in Chief V.N. Chernavin, who, since as far back as 1974, has had a negative attitude toward these proposals for reasons known only to himself, through his 1987 directive declined to introduce them owing to their low effectiveness and potential danger in questions of nuclear submarine survivability...." (This refers to the introduction of proposals guaranteeing the secrecy of the actions of nuclear submarines—I.K.)

Furthermore, in a bid to please V. Chernavin, the USSR Defense Ministry Inspectorate for the Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Installations defined these proposals as potentially dangerous. In the experts' view, the conclusion drawn by the inspectorate (Vice Admiral N. Bisovka) was "highly unconvincing, contradictory, and, in point of fact, aimed at discrediting the proposals."

Meanwhile, V. Chernavin was speaking out indignantly during the 1993 election campaign ("Civic Union") in respect of "the country's decrepit defense," and he felt no responsibility for the collapse of the Navy, in which, back in the pre-perestroika era, he had played an active part.

Both the loss of strategic parity at sea and the possibility of restoring it with minimum outlay in the shortest possible space of time, to which V. Chernavin objected so strongly, were subsequently repeatedly borne out by Academician A.P. Aleksandrov and Fleet Admiral G.M. Yegorov in letters to the USSR president and USSR defense minister, in a comprehensive survey by the Russian Federation Security Ministry sent to the Russian Federation general prosecutor, in a letter from Fleet Admiral G.M. Yegorov and a group of admirals and naval officers to Marshal of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, and in an article entitled "Road to Tsushima" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 01.09.92).

The USSR KGB, the USSR Prosecutor's Office, and the Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office also made repeated appeals for this problem and the Navy's proposals to be examined by the highest authorities.

Top Secret: From a letter from Deputy General Prosecutor N. Shakleyin to Vice Premier G. Khizha.

"...Expressing alarm on the subject of the circumstances listed, Kolton raises the question of imposing order in the matter of supplying the Navy with ships and weaponry, abolishing erroneous decisions by administrative organs, and also calling guilty officials to account...."

"...The repeated incidence of accepting into the effective strength of the Navy ships and vessels with imperfections and defects is confirmed also by materials at the disposal of the prosecutor's oversight body.... An evaluation of information cited concerning the military-technical policy conducted in recent years, as well as the technical level and combat readiness of the Navy, goes beyond the bounds of the competence of the bodies of

the Prosecutor's Office. At the same time, leaving these questions unattended may lead to serious consequences.

"...The former USSR Prosecutor's Office submitted an appeal on this score to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers 25 July 1991, and to the chairman of the Interpublic Economic Committee 20 November 1991, but with no result..."

This request was also heard repeatedly in appeals by ordinary citizens to B.N. Yeltsin and other officials—R. Khasbulatov, G. Barbulis, A. Rutskoy, Yu. Skokov, Yu. Petrov, N. Trubin, V. Stepankov, V. Panichev, V. Baranikov, S. Stepashin, A. Piskunov, V. Ochirov, L. Sharin, A. Lapygin, A. Kotenkov, I. Shalatonov, P. Grachev, and others.

However, all the appeals were examined merely in a cursory manner, with unfounded negative conclusions, or else they were not examined at all. One hazy area is the fact that a large section of state officials, including some from the Russian Security Council who are directly responsible for the country's security, shied away in panic not only from a decision but even from familiarizing themselves with this problem, as if they feared getting burned, and immediately forwarded the documents for conclusion by the main culprits: Fleet Admiral V. Chernavin, general designer I. Spasskiy, Academician Gaponov-Grekhov, and others. Once there, this issue was resolved one-sidedly, tendentiously, and with blatant falsehood and cynicism, refuting the positive results of reconstructions and tactical exercises, the experience of testing and using Naval ships—that is, the truth. You do not have to look far for examples.

Here before us is the conclusion of Academicians I. Spasskiy (USSR Supreme Soviet deputy from the "Red Hundred") and S. Kovalev (both, incidentally, heroes of socialist labor, the latter twice over), two of the most authoritative general designers in the military-industrial complex, prepared by them in 1985 for my report to the Navy commander in chief on supplying the Navy's combat complement with non-combatworthy submarines. Under the stamp "Top Secret," the two academicians expound what is actually not secret information:

"...For the first time in many years of work developing submarines we have run up against the fact of representatives of the apparatus of the Navy Standing Commission for State Acceptance issuing a document which is unprecedented in terms of lack of objectivity, incompetence, and crudeness. We hope that the appearance of this document is an accident determined purely by subjective factors.... I. Kolton's statement that the efficiency of the actions of the U.S. Navy's nuclear submarines is incomensurably higher than ours is unfounded and tendentious.... Statements by the author such as 'industry, with the consent of the Naval Main Directorate for Components Supply, is setting norms for noise levels which lower the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers' are a

gross lie insulting to the collectives of the bureaus and the construction plants. They also discredit the work of the author's colleagues who accepted these nuclear submarines, and of the Navy command which is apparently ignorant about the level of secrecy of the actions of our nuclear submarines.... Considering the aforestated, designers at the Central Design Bureau deem unacceptable the practice of the appearance of documents of this ilk, as they harm the great and complex work to reduce the noise levels of nuclear submarines which is constantly being done by the shipbuilding industry."

It seems appropriate to remind these academicians of an old saying: "Jupiter, you are angry—that means you are not right." And indeed, both academicians lied. They lied. And seven years later, the very same I. Spasskiy was forced to admit to MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent Yu. Teplyakov (no. 48 1992) that: "Our submarines are dozens of times less efficient than the Americans' in terms of noise levels. At high speeds, they are defenseless...." But even in admitting part of the truth, the academician nevertheless continued to lie. Why is it only at high speeds that they are defenseless? They are defenseless at low speeds, at which a missile-carrier's main task has to be carried out.

Considering our distorted system for weapons and military hardware supplies, it is possible to some extent to sympathize with these academicians. But what can be our attitude toward statesmen who should monitor and control this process? I will cite an example. In September, for the purposes of checking the activity of the USSR KGB, including in respect of the aforementioned problems of the Navy, B. Yeltsin appointed a commission under the leadership of S. Stepashin, and I got the chance to expound my view to this commission.

The documents submitted by me contained substantiated proof that the USSR KGB leadership, upon receiving objective information acquired with great difficulty by their subordinates, presented it for specific ends to the higher authorities in the interests of lobby groups in a mode transformed as required by them.

At that time S. Stepashin and his commission (A. Kotenkov and I. Shalatonov) successfully, and over a long period of time, hid the problem of the Navy's combat effectiveness from the Russian Federation president. It could not have been otherwise, if the president failed to react to the crime of the century. Again, my repeated appeals afterwards to S. Stepashin and A. Piskunov had no effect, as the documents were returned to me, and they ignored the instructions of the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies, at which I had appealed on this issue.

It is an interesting fact that people who have concealed the Navy's ills have made steady advances in the service and have risen in the ranks in a way that even D. Yakubovskiy never dreamed of. For example, A. Kotenko and I. Shalatonov, patrons of the military-industrial complex and of V. Chernavin, dilettantes who

displayed no special qualities at all, made breathtaking strides in the space of a year in terms of ranks and posts. Furthermore, Rear Admiral I. Shalatonov, chief of the defense, security, and internal affairs department of the State Legal Administration under the president, is acting in an utterly strange way, as a provocateur. He intercepted a letter I sent to B.N. Yeltsin (the eighth to go unanswered) on problems of the country's defense capability and safeguarding the security of military activity! He has been beating about the bush for a year now and, apparently, has no intention at all of reporting it to the head of state (although he swore to do so). Moreover, the secret document I gave to him for signing, exposing the military-industrial mafia, has not come back. Evidently, he has hidden it from the president, together with other documents relating to questions of the country's defense capability and the security of military service. The very people who had a profound grasp of these problems, that is, Yu. Boldyrev, V. Bakatin, and A. Alekseyev, people prepared to expose the military-industrial mafia, were removed from their posts.

Top Secret: From a Security Ministry (N. Golushko) report to Russian Federation General Prosecutor V. Stepankov.

"Competent specialists note that all the evaluations made by the Navy, military-industrial complex, and scientists in response to appeals to the authorities by A.P. Aleksandrov, G.M. Yegorov, and I.B. Kolton during the 1988-1990 period, as a rule grossly distort and frequently falsify positive results obtained in trials and tactical exercises in the 1982-1986 period, and are intended in the main to confirm the invalid decision made earlier by navy Commander in Chief V. Chernavin, set out in the 1987 directive.

"At the same time, specialists believe that the results of interdepartmental trials and tactical exercises and combat practice make it possible to draw the valid conclusion that there is an urgent need to present proposals primarily for tactical situations where their positive properties could have a significant impact on making the combat use of the Navy more effective.

"Specialists believe that the solution of this key naval problem in this way would fully meet the demands of the new defensive doctrine and conform to the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency."

V. Chernavin, acutely aware of the impending danger, was always able to duck responsibility and had the ability to "make himself scarce," to use the colloquial expression.

This ability of his was strikingly manifested during the incidents involving the loss of the nuclear-powered missile-armed craft in 1986 and the nuclear-powered submarine "Komsomolets" in 1989 and in the 1991 political crisis. But he did manage to do something for himself: He organized some jingoistic pamphlets singing

his praises, and a six-part movie is being shot in the United States on our nuclear fleet. And who is the chief hero of it? You guessed.

The activities of V. Chernavin and his "pals" seem extremely conservative to us: the way they seek close contacts with the military-industrial complex and impede any positive process in the Navy if the introduction of its results runs the risk of dissatisfaction on the part of or loss of contacts with "useful people" who helped them up the ladder of power. A poor outlook, to be frank. V. Chernavin, with his talents, reminds one of the story of General Kuropatkin, who was appointed commander in chief of the Manchurian Army by Nicholas II. The general was honest with the emperor, telling him that the lot had fallen upon him precisely because Russia was so desperately short of talented cadres.

Modern-day Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin is incapable of thinking in this way. Having left the grand office of commander in chief of the Navy, V. Chernavin is compensating for the loss in the area of public "recognition" of his talents. He is an honorary member of the "Sharkhan Stars" [name as transliterated] international union of submariners in the United States and a member of the union's journal's editorial collegium in the FRG; he is a respected figure in the Russian Federation president's team and in the Russian Government—director (for the moment) and member of the collegium of the State Maritime History and Culture Center. He is also president of the "Okeanotekhnika" association; he is president of the union of navy submariners; he is a member of the board of the Naval Aviation Check Investment Fund...

When one analyzes this story, the inevitable question arises: Who is calling the tune? The military-industrial mafia, extracting credits for dangerous, third-rate projects that reduce to naught not only the country's defensive capability, but its economy as well? Will our rulers heed the people's *cri de coeur* on this occasion, heed the truth about the Navy on the eve of its 300th anniversary celebrations?

Adm Baltin Interviewed in Black Sea Fleet Talks

PM2006124394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jun 94 p 2

[Interview with Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, by Captain First Rank Vladimir Pasyakin; date and place not given: "We Will Resolve the Black Sea Fleet Problem in Slavic Interests"]

[Text] [Pasyakin] Comrade Commander, the negotiations on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet are making heavy weather of it—which is having a bad effect not only on Black Sea sailors but also on the residents of many of the garrisons where the fleet is deployed. Now, after so many meetings between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents, the two states' defense ministers, delegations, working groups, and military experts, it seems as though there is

light at the end of the long and confusing negotiating tunnel. How do you view the situation as regards the division of the fleet, the separation of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian Navy headquarters, and the possible leasing of Sevastopol and other bases?

[Baltin] The situation is deadlocked. In order to grasp this, let's look at what objectives Russia and Ukraine are pursuing. They are totally different—Russia has military-political objectives, while Ukraine has purely economic objectives. It is quite obvious that indirectly, by solving its economic problems, Ukraine will then seek to resolve also the tasks of the organizational development of its armed forces on the Crimean Peninsula. And at the Russian economy's expense. That is the fundamental difference.

Let us look further ahead. In order to achieve its objectives, what does Russia want to lease—the Black Sea Fleet infrastructure or territory with Ukrainian citizens? What does it want to have—a naval base or the city of Sevastopol with its impoverished population of many thousands and its ruined urban infrastructure?

[Pasyakin] That's a very unexpected way of looking at it....

[Baltin] I agree—insofar as I am aware, this approach has never been looked at by the expert groups in their work. For instance, I see the problem like this.

What would leasing Sevastopol and its suburbs mean? It would mean needing to accept jurisdiction over around 420,000 Ukrainian citizens, including 127,000 pensioners, 78,000 of whom are still capable of working in the production sphere. Of these, up to 42,000 are employed at fleet enterprises or are directly connected with the sea—fishermen, merchant seamen, ship repair workers. The rest are employed in the private commercial sector or in municipal services. There is no precedent in all of history for leasing a territory and its population. Although many countries—including the United States—have had dozens of bases abroad. At least until 1970.

Military bases, including naval bases, mean, above all, armed forces, all categories of men, and civilian service personnel from the local population living off-base. Good examples of such naval bases are Subic Bay in the Philippines, Okinawa in the Japanese islands, Guantanamo, Gibraltar, Hanko (which the USSR leased from Finland), and others. A naval base should meet certain conditions. Chief among these is that of being under the jurisdiction of the state leasing it. And, second, there should be no locals living on-base if they are not connected with servicing it. Finally, there should be no population growth. Officers, contract servicemen, and so forth discharged to the reserve should not remain permanently resident there.

[Pasyakin] Eduard Dmitriyevich, we know all about U.S. naval bases. Clearly, conditions here are different.

[Baltin] By leasing a territory with a population, Russia, it is now supposed, would conclude a treaty with Kiev and pay trillions [currency unspecified], above all in the form of its energy sources, thereby ensuring the viability of the Ukrainian economy. But, moreover, Russia would be forced to maintain the entire infrastructure of the leased territory and to meet the social needs of the population living there. Thus, under a treaty with Kiev neither the Crimea nor Sevastopol would gain anything directly and would at the same time be demanding extra appropriations from both Kiev and Moscow. They would be granted these appropriations by Kiev as subsidies funded out of Russia's lease payments. And Kiev would look like a benefactor in the public's eyes.

It is not hard to imagine that, with the current economic position of the two states, Ukraine's demands on Russia would constantly increase. Ukraine now sees Russia—as Chornovil has frankly stated—as a "milk cow." Moreover, Russia will be constantly in danger of having the agreement torn up for the slightest infraction, and it will have to pay for the upkeep of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens, and for the support of Ukrainian armed formations.

In short, such a lease would most probably very soon result in the emergence of discontent among the population owing to their low living standards at a time of economic recession. The people of Sevastopol and Crimeans are already profoundly impoverished, and they view the switch to Russian jurisdiction as a chance to improve their living standards. That can be understood, but what will Russia be like? It is exceptionally difficult to meet such intolerable conditions. I would reiterate that there is no precedent for such an agreement anywhere in the world....

A short-term lease (of up to 30 years) would be impermissible anyway....

[Pasyakin] Why?

[Baltin] Because then there would be no point developing and maintaining the existing infrastructure. There would be no point in investing funds—because the short-term lease would not allow us to either preserve or develop the leased territory's infrastructure.

[Pasyakin] What other problems of a future lease worry you?

[Baltin] Ukraine is already lodging numerous complaints about the fleet. For polluting the environment, for instance. You can imagine what would happen if the lease became a reality!

The recent visit to us by an environmental commission headed by the deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Environment Committee revealed a rather strange approach. The commission ascribed all the violations it discovered to the Black Sea Fleet without any investigation or cogent justification. This was graphically visible from the example of its work at Balaklava. It is common

knowledge that the environmental damage done there was caused by the mining administration, not by the fleet. Old residents of Balaklava recall how, when two submarine brigades were based there, there used to be quite a clean city beach in the bay right alongside the submarines and how there used to be commercial fishing operations. But over the past 25 years, owing to the strip mining of alumina from the Balaklava Hills, the bay has become 15-18 meters shallower. The thick layer of silt that used to cover the bottom and was the basis of the life of the flora has been entirely clogged with alumina. The environmental balance has been upset. The food for the fish has disappeared.

However, these flagrant problems were for some reason outside the remit of the environmental commission, which latched onto something else: It photographed fuel oil spills—"evidence" against the fleet. But these appeared after the ships were refueled by the Ukrainian 5th Border Brigade because the refueling operation was not done properly—with the fuel being pumped from fuel tanker trucks without any special airtight devices. As a result, the entire surface [vershina] of the bay was flooded with diesel. And many examples of that kind of bias and juggling with the facts can be cited.

[Pasyakin] To return to the question of the lease, I would like you to explain once more why it is so advantageous to Ukraine?

[Baltin] The decision to lease Sevastopol was made at a closed session of the Ukrainian Security Council back in July-August 1993. But publicly it was decided to reject a lease, although in fact everything is being done precisely to force Russia to lease Sevastopol. The main aim being, as I have already said, to achieve the maximum economic benefit for Ukraine. Now, to judge from the results of the work of the intergovernmental commissions, the scenario devised by the Ukrainian Security Council is being implemented.

In addition, by becoming purely Russian, the Black Sea Fleet base will become similar in status to the 14th Army in the Dniester Region and will become a foreign grouping on Ukrainian territory. In that event, the Black Sea Fleet servicemen must be Russian citizens and will no longer be able to avail themselves of Ukrainian social benefits even though many of them were born and brought up on this territory. Then the infringement of people's rights will begin, deputies representing the Black Sea Fleet seamen will disappear, and there will be residence permits.... This is the familiar path taken by the Baltic states. Ukraine is copying them very closely now. It is not without reason that Ukrainian delegations have been visiting the Baltic and studying the experience of creating an ethnically pure state.

[Pasyakin] What solution do you see here?

[Baltin] The lease of the territory with its population is only possible if it is carried out directly via the Crimea and the revenue from the lease is used to develop the infrastructure of the Crimea, first and foremost that of

Sevastopol. Why such a path precisely? At present the Black Sea Fleet is paying six types of taxes. As the city administration attests, 50 percent of those taxes, amounting to around 1 trillion karbovantsi a year, goes to Kiev. Then—Kiev says—it gives a subsidy to Sevastopol. As far as the public can tell, it does seem that Kiev is maintaining Sevastopol. But essentially what Kiev is doing is returning to Sevastopol a part of the many taxes that it has received from the fleet. For example, in the form of wages to servicemen, workers, and employees and in the form of taxes, the Black Sea Fleet has paid out 1 trillion karbovantsi in the first five months of this year alone, the same figure as the Sevastopol budget, even though in the classical sense the city's budget ought not be subsidized.

The situation is also being aggravated by the fact that the bureaucratic apparatus in the city has grown beyond all measure and costs a vast amount to maintain.

A large administration has also been created in the city's rayons which is structurally and quantitatively larger than in the days of the Soviet Union.

The Internal Affairs Administration, for example, has increased in size 4.8-fold in the space of a year. And what about the mushrooming formations of the National Guard, subunits of the Ukrainian Security Council, the Ukrainian Navy, the Berkut and Sokol special-purpose subunits, and the psychological services? Now the National Guard has demanded 60 apartments. And they have been allocated at the expense of other Sevastopol people, who have been waiting decades for housing.

Nevertheless, with a sensible taxation policy the city could be self-sufficient even in present-day conditions. Admittedly, if there were a lease it would then be necessary to constructively change the existing structures and appoint a viable apparatus in place of the elected one. Or, to use the British method, we could appoint a governor general or governor admiral with structures along the lines of Gibraltar. Then Sevastopol will have military and commercial areas—a base and a port. In addition, the appointed administrative organs will be able to establish municipal property and thus have its own budget. These measures will not in any way be an impediment to the further development of the private sector. The existence of municipal and private property (the municipal segment must constitute at least 60-70 percent) will make it possible to support the city's own budget capable of satisfying a considerable proportion of the population's needs. None of the city's existing administrations can fulfill those tasks at present. The commercial structures are producing virtually nothing. All they do is buy and sell. The city budget's income from them is minimal.

However, this is a topic for a separate discussion. To return to the main theme, I want to stress that the state, in leasing the base, develops [obustroit] only the base, according to world practice. And to divide Sevastopol into base and city is surely simply impossible, so firmly

interlinked are they. In addition, there must not be "foreign" military formations on the leased territory. That is precluded.

[Pasyakin] How do you react to the idea that the Ukrainian Navy headquarters be based in Balaklava—an administrative unit of Sevastopol?

[Baltin] This is not a serious suggestion. Well, suppose they station the Ukrainian Navy in Balaklava. The operational regime in the zone will be maintained by the fleet's forces, of course. Then what will happen is that the Ukrainian Navy is again using the Black Sea Fleet's infrastructure without being accountable for anything. And that infrastructure includes the navigation and hydrographic support facilities, the observation and communications systems, and lines of supply and communication....

[Pasyakin] In the mass media, incidentally, there has been a report that the Ukrainian Navy Command has stopped passing on technical information to the Black Sea Fleet's navigational services. What can you tell us about that?

[Baltin] The Black Sea Fleet Command has never used technical information supplied by the Ukrainian Navy. The Navy simply does not have any information because the navigational and hydrographic infrastructure is in the hands of the Black Sea Fleet. With the exception of the Odessa and Nikolayev hydrographic regions seized by the Ukrainian Navy, which have virtually ceased operations. And the whole responsibility for the safety of shipping in this region rests on the Ukrainian Navy. I cannot predict how they will cope with this task. It is easier to seize regions than to ensure the safety of shipping in them. After all, the Ukrainian Navy has no full-fledged navigation and hydrographic service. They even buy conventional navigation charts from the Russian Federation GUNIO [expansion unknown].

[Pasyakin] So just how can the Black Sea Fleet problem be resolved?

[Baltin] Only by resolving the problem of Crimea. A civilized and nonviolent solution by means of talks, taking into account the opinion and will of the people of Crimea and Sevastopol and the general foreign policy interests of Russia and Ukraine—for the purpose of the national security of all the Slav peoples.

REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Report on Army Housing Problems Part I

PM1506145794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jun 94 p 2

[Part One of two-part report by Colonel Aleksandr Olyinik: "Moscow Military District Receives Troops"]

[Text] Moscow-Voronezh—There is perhaps no task more important for the Moscow Military District at

present than receiving troops from the former Soviet republics and elsewhere and providing them with every facility at their new stationing places in the center of European Russia. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has more than once discussed this nationwide problem, which is relevant to the entire Russian Army. Today we return to this theme.

Trapped by Lack of Funds

One wall of a room in the district headquarters building is completely covered by a map of central Russia, where the Moscow Military District is stationed. Blue flags mark where troops used to be stationed and red flags indicate units and formations which have already been withdrawn or will be withdrawn from abroad by 1995. There are almost twice as many red flags as blue ones. In short, the introduction of troops has radically changed the face of the Moscow Military District, which has now become a border district. The district is changing, its organizational staff structure is continuing to be improved, and it is being supplied with the latest weapons and equipment.

Virtually every staff directorate, service, and department is engaged in tackling this massive task, which—owing to a lack of finances and capering around the already meager military budget—is now on the verge of failure. This is the opinion of Major General Aleksandr Groshv, Moscow Military District deputy troop commander responsible for construction and the billeting of troops.

"For four years now troops have been arriving in the district from abroad in accordance with a Russian Federation government decision and a schedule approved by the Defense Ministry," Aleksandr Ivanovich said. "During this period we have received more than 200 formations, units, and institutions totalling more than 70,000 men. The biggest transfer of troops and equipment has been to Smolensk, Voronezh, Nizhny Novgorod, and Tambov Oblasts and a number of other oblasts. Appropriate agreements for providing the troops with all the necessary facilities, building housing, and allocating land as training grounds have been drawn up with and signed by the heads of their administrations. They have also been signed by Colonel General Leontiy Kuznetsov, commander of the Moscow Military District, and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry is acting as guarantor. But the majority of these agreements are on the point of collapse, because no money is now being made available from the national budget for the construction organizations with which we have concluded agreements.

"Judge for yourself. This year (units and institutions being withdrawn are still arriving in large numbers) we planned to receive 300 billion rubles [R] for this purpose, but in fact only R60 billion have been allocated. There can be no talk of speeding ahead, as planned, with commissioning housing and utilities for the units arriving; the schedule for building barracks and vehicle

depots in Smolensk Oblast and in Boguchar in Voronezh Oblast has broken down. Essentially, troops are being greeted by open fields...."

It is true what the people say: Better to see something once than hear about it 100 times. The things I have seen in Voronezh and Boguchar really are staggering, because of the difficult conditions in which officers, ensigns, and their families are having to start working and living at their new stations. As a rule, they have been waved off from Germany and the Baltic countries to the ceremonial beat of kettledrums, but at home they have met with neglect. At the will of the state, thousands of military servicemen and their families have essentially been thrown on their own resources in order to survive. But one thing at a time.

Even in the square outside Voronezh Station you are struck by the large numbers of people in military uniform. Caps with blue or green bands are glimpsed time and again in the crowd. But most of the servicemen wear emblems common to all arms.

"Voronezh has possibly not seen such an influx of troops since the war, when the district headquarters was here," Major General Vladimir Chuzhikov, head of the Voronezh Garrison, told me. "People living in the oblast and heads of administration show them constant attention and help in any way they can. Nevertheless, more than half of our units have been withdrawn to empty, unprepared places. Well, you can see for yourself where we are having to work...."

I am talking to Major General Chuzhikov at headquarters, where just two offices have been more or less repaired: the commander's and the duty officer's. This red brick building—once a convent—was built at the beginning of the century. All kinds of institutions were here during the years of Soviet power! It has not been repaired at all for about 40 years: The heating and water supply systems are in a dangerous state, the roof is wrecked, and in some rooms the ceiling has fallen through.... According to planning estimates, it will cost more than R6 billion to renovate the building. The capacity of military construction organizations in the city would allow all repair work to be carried out in full this year. But there is no money, alas. Ludicrous though it may sound, the limited resources only cover 0.5 percent of the work.

The general shows me piles of documents. Material on receiving corps units (they are scattered over six oblasts), planning estimates for building barracks, depots for equipment, and storehouses for food, and agreements concluded with city and oblast heads of administration....

"All the necessary documents have long been drawn up, but they are not being implemented," Vladimir Petrovich sadly summed up. "They are not being implemented because money is not being made available by the state. The district has given us everything it possibly can and the oblast has helped out with resources, but this does not solve the problem."

The conversation in the office of Vasilii Kovalev, deputy head of Voronezh Oblast Administration, was also about the main issue: money to provide facilities for the troops and build housing for the servicemen. Even now, more than 3,600 apartments are required for officers and warrant officers discharged from the Army without housing as a result of personnel cuts. That figure rises to more than 5,000 if you include all the military servicemen arriving here in need of housing.

I should point out that, in addition to the considerable cost of providing troops with the facilities they need, Voronezh Oblast is also gaining indisputable benefits. It is planned to commission several residential buildings erected by military construction organizations in Voronezh by the end of this year. It is also planned to build an entire residential district overlooking the reservoir and, at the same time, lay roads and heat and water supply networks and build social and cultural facilities.

In Boguchar, where tank crews are stationed, a Turkish firm is building a military camp with 1,753 apartments, a school complete with swimming pool and conservatory, two kindergartens, a clinic, stores, and so forth.

It must be said that the city and oblast administration and some commercial structures take an understanding attitude to the military's needs and help in any way they can. For example, following a decision by the head of the oblast administration, the "Shilovo" and "Rechnoye" Boarding Houses are serving as temporary abodes for officers' families. R6 million have been allocated from the city budget to repair the corps headquarters, and land has been set aside without delay for the purpose of stationing units and establishing training grounds. Viktor Atlasov, head of the Southeast Railroad Administration, has met the military halfway in the lease of containers for storing the personal effects of officers and warrant officers and has organized an efficient train service to take equipment to where troops are stationed. But all this has to be paid for nowadays. How far into debt can you go? For example, the military department owes more than R65 million for the use of just one gantry crane at Kantemirovka Station, where tanks and self-propelled weapons arriving from Germany are being unloaded.

"We cannot solve all these problems without a clear government program for providing troops with the facilities they need," Vasilii Fedorovich Kovalev believes. "The potential of the city and the oblast is now limited: Market relations are everywhere. State subsidies are also meager. For example, in the past the military did not have to pay for land to be used for military units and training grounds, but now they have to hand over the money. Considerable amounts of money. For example, the Defense Ministry must pay R102 billion at 1992 prices for a tank crew training ground near Boguchar. But, instead of money, the ministry has sent us a letter saying that payment for the land will be delayed even further...."

It seems that only now are we all, including state structures, becoming increasingly acutely aware that making cuts in the Armed Forces and redeploying them on a massive scale is almost more expensive than it was to maintain the Soviet Army. According to the most approximate estimates, withdrawing just one division from Germany and providing it with every facility in open fields near Boguchar will cost the state R500 billion. We have already mentioned above how many such units have been received by the Moscow Military District alone. But who has counted these costs?

Apart from the purely financial side, there are other ways of measuring the loss to the Army and the country as a whole. While preparations for withdrawing troops are underway (this period lasts a year or more), officers and warrant officers—the backbone of the Army—lose their experience and professional expertise. How many officers, particularly young ones, have waved goodbye to the Army forever during this period!

This trend is very characteristic of units being withdrawn from abroad to new places of service in Russia. Particularly where, for various reasons, they are not ready to receive the troops and where because of a chronic lack of funds plans are being frustrated to build military camps and homes for officers' families in the "back of beyond" of Voronezh Oblast—Boguchar—to which the withdrawal of the 10th Ural-Lvov Volunteer Tank Division from Germany is nearing completion. Essentially, the formation is being stationed in open fields. So why has this happened? That is what we will discuss in part two.

Report on Army Housing Problems Part II

PM1506164394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Jun 94 p 2

[Second and Final part of report by Colonel Aleksandr Oliynik: "Moscow Military District Receives Troops."]

[Text]

Moscow-Voronezh-Boguchar—In a Field Near oBoguchar

The ancient city of Boguchar is in the Voronezh Oblast "hinterland." Legend has it that it got its name from Peter I. One day when the young sovereign was sailing completed ships north along the Don he weighed anchor at the mouth of an unnamed stream. Strong drinks were poured into goblets, but there proved to be one goblet too many. "This goblet is for god [Bogu charka siya]," Petr said in jest, knocking it back. From that day the stream became the Bogucharka and the town got its name from it.

Now the once quiet rayon center in the very south of the oblast is experiencing a rebirth. "Life in Boguchar is changing drastically," the rayon newspaper SELSKAYA NOV wrote in a May issue. "And as we know the foundation to this change was laid by the transfer of an

armored division from Germany. Some 7,000 people will come to us, as many as live in the rayon center now...."

I do not know how it is for the Boguchar inhabitants but for the servicemen of the 10th Ural-Lvov Volunteer Armored Division which has come here from Germany life in a new place has indeed changed drastically. For the worse, unfortunately.

Before the armored troops arrived it was planned to construct at a preferential rate at least the main establishments—barracks, headquarters, storehouses, shelters for equipment, as was done for other troops arriving on the territory of the Moscow Military District. I shall note that construction was still being carried out 12-18 months ago when there were funds.

Now only ferroconcrete posts rise up alone in place of barracks. All the heavy vehicles—and that includes modern T-80 tanks and 152mm self-propelled artillery mount vehicles—are in the open air. There are not even any fences or roads—after each rainfall you can neither walk nor drive across the black earth.

"In fact the division has been put out of action for the time being," Major General Yevgeniy Vorobyev, a tank force leader from Voronezh, agrees with me. "But we are not to blame—the corps too is only being created and the Moscow Military District has given us what it can. There is no one in the division to service the vehicles—soldiers under contract (almost all tank crews in the regiments consisted of volunteers) have not extended their contracts and have gone home. The majority of officers and ensigns are on leave and we do not know which of them will serve in this 'hinterland.'"

Indeed, the armored troops have been unlucky, so to speak, in their new stationing. The country is wonderful here, but the infrastructure is very underdeveloped. It is 65 km to the nearest railroad station, Kantemirovka. Fuel is delivered from Voronezh, 250km away. Even water is brought in.

It was not only strategic aims which were being pursued in the early nineties when the venue for the 10th division's withdrawal was determined. I was told at the corps headquarters that the deciding factor was that Bogucharskiy Rayon agreed to take in the armored troops, counting on the city being built up and on the railroad being extended to the rayon center....

"Why are there so few people in the fields?" I asked Colonel Vladimir Skokov, the division's deputy commander, a Muscovite, incidentally, who says he does not want to return to the capital. "After all the formation's withdrawal is virtually coming to an end?"

"But where are people to go?" Vladimir Viktorovich answers one question with another. "There is no housing, even containers with their personal belongings are a problem to accommodate. In addition many have children at school. So they have gone their separate ways.

Some have taken their families to their parents, some are still in Germany. But in a month or two the main backbone of the division will be here...."

One wants to hope that is how it will be. People will come to a new place but how will they serve here if there is just a small flag where the future headquarters should stand?

"When do you think you will construct the barracks?" I asked a group of obviously bored construction workers.

"No one knows," work superintendent Vladimir Pecherskiy spoke for them all. "If we had the funds we would complete construction in a few months. But we have not been paid wages for April yet and there is no money for construction materials. So we sit idle for weeks yet we are no less interested in work than the armored troops—our families have nothing to live on."

It has turned out that the local construction workers consist of Russian refugees who have come to Boguchar from Tajikistan. There are now several thousand of them in the city and they live where they can, half starving. To give them work the city administration has created the "Bogucharstroy" enterprise to erect the barracks and the division's vehicle pool facilities. They reckoned that the military department had the necessary funds and it would be possible to earn money.

While Colonel Skokov and I were walking across the field where the construction should be I thought: This is where we should bring the State Duma and government politicians who, despite it all, try to put the Army on financial starvation rations! After all it is the uncertainty over the military budget and the lack of money which above all have struck a pitiless blow to the units withdrawn from remote and nearby foreign parts. In Boguchar, Yelnya, Vyazma, and other regions of the Moscow Military District. And not just in the Moscow Military District....

It is shameful to write but the armored troops are in fact living on the city's charity. They receive bread, food, and coal on credit. They do not even have the money to wash or to clean their clothes. Never mind combat readiness—just surviving is enough!

At the vehicle parking area of one regiment I met an officer with an armband—the pool duty officer. He was Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy Slyusarenko, commander of a repair platoon. In rubber boots and dirty overalls he differed little from the construction workers. I do not write this to criticize him. It is hard to observe uniform regulations if you are in mud up to your knees and there are just a few officers for a tank regiment. They go on duty every other day. They have been living in a site hut

without their families for over six months now. Slyusarenko, for instance, sent his wife to her parents in Tomsk. He has not received his wages for several months. He has already sold his videorecorder, his television set is next. He needs something to live on.

All the division's officers and ensigns and their families are in this unenviable position. And under these conditions when, as one officer put it, the state has left them to look after themselves, the officers are continuing to serve. They are continue, I may add, on enthusiasm alone—those who are not indifferent to the fate of the Russian Army and its future.

From dawn until dusk the task forces from the regiment take in vehicles with freight, unload them by hand, and stack the munitions and food. They work without counting the time, without sparing their strength. But there is a limit to everything. They cannot pay for the construction of barracks out of their own pockets. And neither more nor less than 102 billion rubles must be paid to the rayon for the allocation of land for a testing range.

"That price is fair, in strict accordance with the law on the land," I was told by Nikolay Zhmykhov, head of the Bogucharskiy Rayon administration. "We realize that the military department now has no money from the budget—let them give us vehicles for the countryside, equipment for processing agricultural products in exchange. After all, we must seek a way out of the situation—every summer day counts. Otherwise the division will spend the winter in tents...."

The people who are not losing an hour, never mind a day, are the construction workers from Turkey. For German marks they will erect a whole town for the armored troops in Boguchar. Here there will be over 40 high-rise apartment blocks, a school with a pool and a greenhouse, two kindergartens, a sports center, a savings bank, and stores.... The cost of the contract is 153 million deutschemarks. The deadline for commissioning is August this year. According to Mr. Akhmad Sarvash [name as transliterated], the construction chief, they are also 4-6 weeks behind the construction schedule. It is for that reason that over 2,000 workers are now working on constructing the city in three shifts—day and night. Let me add that all work here is automated and with that pace the construction will probably be completed on time. The first new apartments for the armored troops are planned for early August.

....I would like to end these far from gratifying notes with that impressive fact. But I cannot. Before my eyes is a peg with a little flag on the site of the future headquarters and a senior lieutenant in rubber boots standing along next to the tanks. How wet will they get under the rain and snow?

Methods of Economizing in Bleak Budgetary Era

94UM0441A Moscow TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL
VOYENNO-EKONOMICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 4, Apr 1994 p 59

[Editorial: "Documents and Commentary: Plans and Resources—The Search for Ways To Achieve a Balance"]

[Text] It is no secret that funding for the Armed Forces is extremely inadequate today. However, some plans for military training plans are striking in their abundance and scope of activities. When are we going to stop dissipating our resources, when are we going to learn to economize?—Lieutenant Colonel V. Belousov.

This question from a letter to the editors is basically rhetorical. But we decided not to ignore it and asked Colonel S. Ignatyev, an officer in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense central staff, to discuss this topic.

The current situation with regard to funding the Armed Forces is very strained. And the defense minister has directed administrative agencies to search for ways to cut costs and ensure strict austerity and rational use of the financial resources appropriated for defense needs. The basis for this must be laid as we plan the development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in 1994-1995.

I would like to identify basic areas of staff work that make it possible to conserve resources.

Combat- and mobilization-readiness plans and organization and methodological directives must be coordinated with amounts of appropriations and material and technical resources.

In planning command-staff, tactical, specialized tactical, demonstrative and other exercises, staff training exercises, and wargames, a careful analysis must be made of their usefulness and effectiveness. The composition of exercise participants, as well as the manpower and resources used to support them, must be the optimum choices.

It is essential to thoroughly reexamine the existing practice of holding training and assembly exercises that entail the consumption of valuable materials and financial resources for planning and implementation and the reimbursement of travel expenses and payment of per diems to assembly attendees, as well as keep assembly sites as close as possible to troops and forces and limit them to three to five days.

It is also necessary to sharply reduce the number of training assemblies and meetings held with commanders of districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies, and military educational institutions and that involve summoning a large number of officers to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other major cities, and to arrange to hold clustered training assemblies and meetings and stop sending several commanding officers of military administrative agencies (commanding officers and their deputies, administration, department, and service chiefs, etc.) to them.

Operational, training, training and methodological and other training assemblies (classes) for commanding officers of large formations and military units and administrative officers of formations and military units (ships), military educational institutions, the military departments of state educational institutions for higher professional education, and military missions should be planned on a garrison basis, as a rule. The minimum necessary number of personnel and military equipment should be used to prepare and support training assemblies. Training camps, firing range operations, and field excursions must be put in proper order.

In planning measures involving physical training and sports, the main emphasis should be on holding large-scale competitions and sports festivals directly in military units and at military educational institutions. We must limit the amount of appropriations and number of championships among the branches of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, districts, groups of forces, fleets, and large formations and units, as well as competitions among military academies and schools.

In order to more coordinate operational and combat- and mobilizational-readiness plans with available appropriations and material and technical resources, plans should be subjected to comprehensive economic scrutiny and cleared with financial and economic agencies before being approved. Proposals for inclusions in the Russian Armed Forces training plan that are submitted to the Russian Armed Forces General Staff must be substantiated with necessary calculations of financial expenditures that have been cleared with the Russian Ministry of Defense Chief Military Budget and Financing Administration.

Balancing plans for combat training and material, technical, and financial support for planned activities will make it possible to maintain the required level of combat and mobilizational readiness in our Army and Naval Forces.

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UKRAINE

Ukraine's Crimea Concerns Aired, National Guard Involved

Ukrainian Congress of Crimea Declaration

94UM0467A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
2 Jun 94 p 1

[Unattributed item: "It Is Good That It Is Not as Hot in Crimea as It Is Surrounding It"]

[Text] "The unprecedented flirting with separatists in Crimea has finally reached its logical conclusion," says a statement from the Kerch organization of the Ukrainian Civic Congress of Crimea [UHKK], which represents the interests of the 700,000 Ukrainians of Crimea.

The Kerch organization of the UHKK asserts that "a totalitarian dictatorship based on Russian chauvinist principles, lightly coated with general democratic rhetoric, is now taking shape in Crimea."

The Kerch organization of the UHKK, and the Kerch organization of the Ukrainian Republican Party that is in solidarity with it, are demanding that official Kiev act immediately and decisively. Any further concessions to the separatist rebels will not only fail to appease them, but will rather motivate them to commit further acts to make Crimea secede from Ukraine and join Russia, the statement emphasizes.

'Anti-State' Activity by Sevastopol City Council

94UM0467B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
2 Jun 94 p 1

[Unattributed item: "Ukrainian Land Is Not Up for Auction!"]

[Text] So says a statement from the "State Independence of Ukraine," an all-Ukrainian political association.

The Sevastopol City Council, pursuing anti-state activity aimed at the departure of Crimea from Ukraine and the dissolution of Ukrainian statehood, resolved to conduct a poll on June 26 with the question, "Do you favor the status of the city of Sevastopol as the main base for the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in accordance with the Russian-Ukrainian protocol of September 1993?" It simultaneously proposes the redeployment of the Ukrainian Navy from Sevastopol to some other city. "We feel that such appeals are anti-state. The City Council does not have the right to assume the functions of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. The population does not have the right to determine the basing location of the Black Sea Fleet through a poll," indicates the statement.

National Guard Presence in Accord With Laws

94UM0467C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
25 May 94 p 1

[Article by Guards Lieutenant-Colonel Volodymyr Korkodym: "In Accordance With the Laws of Ukraine"]

[Text] Subunits of the National Guard of Ukraine [NHU] stationed in the Crimea are continuing to carry out, as before, the task of safeguarding public order as stipulated by law. According to a previously approved plan that was coordinated with internal-affairs bodies, details of Guardsmen without weapons are going out into the streets of Simferopol at night to protect the citizenry against criminal infringements. Classes in combat training are also continuing according to the usual plan. Topics are being practiced in particular that are envisaged by the training program for cleaning up the consequences of a natural disaster.

Some of the mass media, however, have tried to inflame the situation surrounding the units of the National Guard of Ukraine, which have been located in Crimea since 1992. All kinds of gossip surrounding BTRs [armored personnel carriers] that have arrived on the peninsula is spreading. The press service of the NHU command has been authorized to announce that the military hardware has returned to its units after the planned seasonal repairs at a plant. The means of transport on hand in the subunits are only 14 percent of the necessary standard quantity. Insinuations aimed at creating tensions around a military unit that is being formed in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "The National Guard of Ukraine" thus seem curious.

Guardsmen Maintaining Order in Simferopol

94UM0467D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
1 Jun 94 p 1

[Unattributed item: "The Guardsmen Are Protecting Civic Order on the Streets of Simferopol"]

[Text] The press service of the NHU [National Guard of Ukraine] has announced that the personnel stationed in Simferopol from the military unit of the National Guard commanded by Guards Colonel Oleksandr Kostyukov is performing the task of protecting civic order on the streets of the capital of the Republic of Crimea, five times a week during the evening hours in conjunction with the police as envisaged by law. The Guardsmen are fighting street crime and trying to ensure the safety of the city's inhabitants against criminal infringements during their service.

More than 3,200 infractions have been halted this year on the patrol routes of the Guardsmen, seven crimes were discovered in progress and a quantity of firearms were confiscated. The results of the service are considerably better than last year.

The increased effectiveness of the protection of civic order has been achieved thanks to the increased quality of the combat proficiency of the soldiers and the planned increase in their numbers.

National Guard Facility Harassed

94UM0467E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
1 Jun 94 p 2

[Article from press service of the NHU [National Guard of Ukraine] commander and Ukrinform under the rubric "In the National Guard": "Can You Have Forgotten That We Are Brethren?"]

[Text] The military compound of the subunit of the National Guard in the city of Sevastopol has been under the vigilant attention of persons unknown lately. Individuals armed with firearms have repeatedly penetrated the NHU facility, which is protected only by an unarmed day detail, at night.

Tactical classes of Marines from the Black Sea Fleet are being conducted immediately adjacent to the premises where the Guardsmen are based.

The operation of the Guardsmen's electronic-warfare (REB) systems was suppressed for several hours, while telephone communications were cut and were restored only with the aid of internal-affairs bodies.

Unknown persons in civilian dress but a clear military bearing are constantly near the checkpoint of the subunit. It has moreover been ascertained that someone has prepared 200 meters of the common roadway leading to the military compound for demolition—the locations for the placement of explosives are linked by an electrical network.

A joint police and Guard patrol that was assigned to guard this area on the night of May 25 set up an ambush close to the NHU unit. Soon, around 1:30, the sentries noticed an unknown person who, seeing people in uniform, threw something away and took to his heels. But in vain. The detainee had on himself military kit, a pistol holster and the special matches of reconnaissance personnel. Five kilograms of TNT and a TT pistol were found at the scene of the incident. The unknown person was ascertained to be citizen D. Yoho, and was transferred to the proper authorities. An investigation is underway.

The press service of the National Guard of Ukraine is calling on all soldiers who are serving on the Crimean peninsula not to permit such acts of provocation among themselves, and to resolve problems in an evenhanded and friendly manner in the name of peace and harmony in the region.

Can it really be permitted that the servicemen of Ukraine and Russia fight, that mutual hatred fill our hearts? Think about it—to whose advantage is this?

Guardsmen Maintaining Order in Sevastopol

94UM0467F Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
4 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Yuriy Kondratyev: "The Guardsmen Have Arrived to Maintain Order"]

[Text] The first subunits of a special battalion of the National Guard of Ukraine have arrived in Sevastopol.

The Center for Civil Liaison of the Ukrainian Armed Forces of the city has reassured Sevastopol residents, by announcing that the chief tasks of the National Guardsmen will be the protection of the constitutional system of Ukraine, work in conjunction with internal-affairs bodies, and assistance to the Border Troops in apprehending violators of the state border.

The decision to station subunits of the National Guard in all oblast and equivalent cities of Ukraine was made in 1993. The soldiers of the battalion will take part, in the near future, in measures planned by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Sevastopol to protect civic order.

The leadership of the Directorate of Internal Affairs expressed the hope that the transfer of the National Guard subunits to the city will promote a preservation of the trend toward stability in civic order that has been noted in Sevastopol.

It only remains to add that the battalion of National Guardsmen is commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ihor Kurovskyy, and that its size at the end of May was 351 men.

Ukrainian Nationalists Call for More Troops in Crimea

94UM0452A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Anatoliy Polyakov in Kiev and Vladimir Pasyakin in Sevastopol: "Crimean Knot: Should It Be Cut or Untied?—Nationalists in Ukrainian Parliament Demand That Additional Troops Be Sent to Crimea"]

[Text] All last week the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet heatedly debated the situation on the peninsula. President Leonid Kravchuk, who spoke first, proposed the appointment of a Constitutional Court that would issue a ruling on the Crimean Supreme Soviet's last law. Kravchuk pointed out that he himself does not have the right to rescind the Crimean parliament's decision, that he has such a prerogative only with respect to decrees issued by Yuriy Meshkov.

At the same time, he emphasized that "Russia will never give up its influence in the Crimea, just as the Russian population, which makes up a majority on the peninsula, will never give up close relations with Russia." "We realize," the president continued, "that Russia has no realistic alternatives to basing the Black Sea Fleet and must secure its southern borders. We must divide basing

zones between the Ukrainian and Russian fleets, establish temporary leasing terms, and at the same time uphold the principle that the Russian Fleet must eventually be based on its own territory."

National-democratic deputies, without bothering to analyze the factors that have led to the current situation in the Crimea, blamed everything on Russia. They demanded that the Crimean knot be cut in the following way: make power-wielding structures subordinate to Kiev and remove the Black Sea Fleet from Ukrainian territory by January 1, 1995. Deputies representing the Ukrainian National Assembly-UNSO [Ukrainian People's Self-Defense Forces] demanded that the Crimean Supreme Soviet be dissolved immediately and that additional troops be sent there to "protect the population from extremists. Although, we should point out, leftist deputies reminded the "loggers" (as one deputy referred to his more zealous colleagues) that at stake is the fate of thousands of people, and that politicians just don't go swinging axes. Deputy Mikhail Doroshevskiy stressed that he knows of plans for a forcible change of power in Crimea, as he had seen documents in the working presidium confirming this.

Many deputies believe that some of the causes of the current flare-up of tension in and around Crimea are the imposition of ideological stereotypes of a nationalist slant, a self-isolationist policy on the part of the Ukrainian leadership, and ill-considered decisions on borders that have divided the Slavic peoples.

A decision which was adopted states that it is essential to submit proposals on bringing current Crimean legislation into conformity with the Ukrainian Constitution within two weeks. The Crimean Supreme Soviet is ordered to adopt a decision to the effect that Crimean legislation must conform to the Ukrainian Constitution within 30 days. Leonid Kravchuk is instructed to propose a list of actions he will take to normalize the situation in Crimea within six days. A Ukrainian parliamentary delegation led by Boris Oleynik left for Crimea on Thursday morning. That same day, as was to be expected, Leonid Kravchuk proposed that parliament postpone the presidential election to a later date.

The situation with respect to dividing the Black Sea is developing in an interesting way, in our opinion. At a press conference in Kiev on Wednesday, Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskiy said that where the Ukrainian Navy will be based is Ukraine's internal affair and is not subject to discussion. The Crimean problem, he said, should be solved through dialogue. "We are taking Russia's interests into account with respect to its southern flank, but it is not taking our interests into account and allowing itself to engage in unilateral pressure," the minister said.

Meanwhile, negotiations on dividing the Black Sea Fleet are under way in Sevastopol, albeit behind closed doors and in the absence of the delegation chiefs—Russian Special Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin and Ukrainian

Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmirov. This has significantly lowered the talks' level, but it is a logical move: The military experts are at work. But we have learned from a well-informed source of an agreement to divide the ships 50-50, after which Ukraine would sell an agreed-upon number of ships to Russia.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Deputies View New Defense Minister Choice

944K1429A Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 27 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Inga Abgarova and Tinatin Gviniashvili:
"Lt. Gen. V. Nadibaidze Was Confirmed as Georgia's
Minister of Defense"]

[Text]

Arguments of the Opposition Did Not Affect Results
The meeting of the Georgian Parliament, which was held yesterday, was declared closed. And no wonder. The question concerning the confirmation of the candidacy of the Republic's Minister of Defense was submitted to the verdict of members of Parliament.

Head of the State Eduard Shevardnadze put forward the candidacy of Lt-Gen V. Nadibaidze, who until yesterday served as Deputy Commander for Armaments of the Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus. This factor caused dissatisfaction on the part of the opposition and, at the same time, was the main argument "for" in the camp of the parliamentary majority.

Irina Sarishvili, deputy of the National Democratic Party of Georgia, declared:

"I am of the opinion that it was not obligatory to confirm the candidacy of the Minister of Defense today. We have bitter experience with such a hasty appointment for this post. The head of the state could have appointed General Nadibaidze and observed for some time whether he justified such high trust. Unfortunately, professionalism, of course, is obligatory, but by no means the only quality that a minister of defense must have. Although, I do not deny, most of the opposition's arguments sounded simply foolish.

"I could not vote for this candidacy, because I do not know this man and I simply do not trust the personnel policy of the head of the state. In general, today reminded me of the ratification of Georgia's entry into the CIS. In any event, the composition of deputies was the same as then, which does not happen often."

Nevertheless, the position expressed by I. Sarishvili in no way affected the voting results. Deputies voted for the confirmation of the minister's candidacy by a majority vote. Out of the 158 present in the hall seven abstained and three voted "against." The parliamentary majority was 118 people.

Naturally, we were interested in the opinion of parliament deputy Tengiz Kitovani, who, as is well known, held the post of Minister of Defense at one time.

"Undoubtedly, V. Nadibaidze is a man with experience," Kitovani said. "And I will be very happy if he manages to do something for Georgia. Although I suspect that it will be difficult for him to work with our ambitious generals."

The Majority Is Certain That the Choice Was Made Correctly

With regard to the parliamentary majority Vice-Speaker Vakhtang Rcheulishvili expressed its arguments.

"The chief thing that acted in V. Nadibaidze's favor was his professionalism," he said. "We were convinced that a normal battleworthy army could not be established with good intentions and patriotism alone. Professionalism is needed here. Taking into consideration the path traversed by General Nadibaidze in the Russian Army, this is one of the worthiest candidacies for the post of the minister of defense.

"If we want to build an army, naturally, we need Russia's help and, of course, real help. Keeping in mind our past and geopolitical situation, the Russian Army is a loyal ally for us. Undoubtedly, General Nadibaidze's personal contacts will help us to establish contacts with the Russian Army. Confrontation with Russia did not and will not bring us anything good. The policy adopted by Georgia for rapprochement with Russia and with the former Union republics and, above all, for a real functioning of CIS mechanisms requires precisely such a person at this post.

"The opposition's guarded attitude in connection with the fact that Nadibaidze was in active service in the army of a foreign state has no basis. In the world there are dozens of examples of a state, which does not have its own personnel base in a certain sector, inviting its compatriot from abroad for service. Estonia's Minister of Defense is an Estonian by birth, who served in the American Armed Forces and at one time took part in the Vietnam War."

'I Will Try To Justify the Trust and To Perform My Duty to the Homeland...'

The minister of defense himself, immediately after the confirmation of his candidacy, gave an exclusive interview to SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA.

[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] What is your main task at this stage?

[Nadibaidze] The chief thing for me now is to build, or rather, to continue building Georgia's Armed Forces on the basis that we already have.

[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] Does building the Georgian Army imply the possibility of Abkhazia's return by military means?

[Nadibaidze] Abkhazia is an issue for politicians. I am a soldier and my business is to establish the army.

[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] Are you not afraid that the lot of General Kamkamidze, who left Georgia at one time, will befall you?

[Nadibaidze] I do not know which lot of Kamkamidze you are talking about. Today he is one of the best military figures. I have information that he left Georgia voluntarily. Personally, I will try to justify the people's trust and to fully perform my duty to the homeland.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Glukhikh: Reform, Stabilization of Defense Industry

94UM0449A Moscow KONVERSIYA in Russian
No 1, 1994 pp 3-6

[Article by State Committee of the Russian Federation for the Defense Sectors of Industry [Goskomoboronprom] Chairman Viktor Konstantinovich Glukhikh under the rubric "Politics, Economics": "The Development of Reforms and the Stabilization of the Activity of the Defense Sectors of Industry"]

[Text] The defense complex of Russia today is more than 2,000 enterprises and organizations at which more than 4.5 million people work.

What typifies the current state of the defense complex? First and foremost, powerful shifts in the structure of production and conversion.

The share of civilian products produced by defense enterprises has doubled over the last two or three years, and is almost 80 percent of their production today.

The amounts of financing of orders for the delivery of arms have meanwhile decreased by almost nine times over 1992-93, and for military NIOKR [scientific research and experimental design] by more than eight times. Defense orders are today providing for the utilization of only 10—15 percent of specialized production capacity as a result.

The small quantities of arms and military hardware being ordered are making their production economically disadvantageous. A real threat has arisen of the impossibility of the renewal, where necessary, of the production of some models of arms and military hardware, as well as the loss of a number of promising technologies.

An outflow of skilled personnel (about two million people) from the defense sectors is underway owing to the sharp cutbacks in military orders, worsened financial state of the enterprises and the low wage levels (they are roughly 1.6 times lower than for the national economy as a whole), and enterprises are beginning to refuse defense production.

A critical situation has taken shape where not only the defense security of the country, but its economic security as well, are threatened.

Goskomoboronprom, taking this situation into account, has developed a conceptual framework for an industrial policy in the defense complex, and is implementing a program of actions to stabilize the situation in the defense sectors of industry. The following priorities have been delineated:

- the creation of unsurpassable scientific work in progress, and the development and production of technically advanced and highly efficient systems and models of arms and military hardware;

- the integration of military and civilian production, with an orientation toward the widespread utilization of dual-use technologies;

- the formation of mobilization capacity and reserves based on contemporary principles;

- the restoration and expansion of cooperative ties with the defense complexes of the CIS member nations, and improvement of interaction with the regions of Russia.

The realization of 14 dedicated conversion programs has begun in accordance with the State Program of Conversion for 1993-95 that was adopted by the government.

The work, including major NIOKR projects, is focused on such priority areas as transport and communications, the fuel-and-power complex, agriculture and the consumer market, medicine and ecology.

The first results have been achieved in the reconfiguration of defense product lines for the output of civilian products. The defense complex demonstrated new types of such products at fairs at Nizhny Novgorod, Vladimir, Irkutsk and at an exhibition in Tula. Production volumes are also being increased. Tens of thousands of new jobs have been created.

The impact could have been far more substantial if credits for conversion had been issued in the needed amounts and in a timely manner. The minimally necessary financing for the most important civilian types of NIOKR was able to be arranged after a long delay.

An opportunity has appeared today of planning the innovation process with great confidence—first and foremost research and development on priority civilian topics, which was disastrously lacking in 1991-92.

Goskomoboronprom is counting on the fact that industrial policy in the defense sectors will be pursued with the proper state support and budgetary financing for the research and development of dual-use (multisector) applications, as well as those types of NIOKR that are "breakthrough" types against the background of world scientific and technical development or are "critical" from the point of view of ensuring the defensive capabilities and economic security of the country. Goskomoboronprom is working today to clarify these key areas so as to provide for the most efficient utilization of the NIIs [scientific-research institutes] and KBs [design bureaus], as well as to manage the scientific and technical potential that is available in the defense sectors as efficiently as possible.

One main area of economic reform is institutional transformation, which includes the conversion of ownership, privatization, the reform of state enterprises and organizations, support for entrepreneurship and the development of a market infrastructure, the demonopolization

of the economy and the formation of a competitive environment, the development of a financial market, and the improvement of legislation. These transformations also fully affect the defense sectors of industry as well.

Goskomoboronprom consistently carried out the state privatization program in 1992-92.

Shares of stock in more than 500 state enterprises were planned to be sold by the end of 1993. The conversion of more than 1,000 enterprises in the defense complex—that is, more than 60 percent of the overall number of enterprises in the defense sectors of industry—was predicted in 1994.

The State Privatization Program envisages the existence of a "core," consisting of 449 enterprises in the defense complex, where changes in the form of ownership would not be expedient.

The specific sector features of the privatization of enterprises and organizations in the defense complex and the basic directions for improving the methods of privatizing them are reflected in the Edict of the President of Russia "Specific Features of Privatization and Additional Measures of State Regulation of the Activity of Enterprises in the Defense Sectors of Industry" (No. 1267, 19 August 1993).

Goskomoboronprom, in accordance with a decree of the Russian government on a plan of actions for the realization of economic reform, is assisting the organization of joint-stock companies and financial-industrial groups in the defense sectors. The Vypel international joint-stock company, the Energiya NPO [Scientific-Production Association] imeni Academician S.P. Korolev Russian holding company and the Arsenal holding company (St. Petersburg), among a number of others, have already been created.

A new form of interaction of Goskomoboronprom with the joint-stock companies being created, in the form of equal agreements between it and those companies regardless of their organizational and legal forms, has been devised in the process of issuing shares of stock in the enterprises and organizations of the defense sectors of industry.

The enterprises of Goskomoboronprom can independently make far from all items without cooperative deliveries from the CIS countries, even though 80 percent of the capacity for the output of the most important types of products (first and foremost arms and military hardware) remained on the territory of Russia. The range of borrowed constituent items exceeds many thousands therein.

It would seem preferable not to waste trillions of rubles on the sweeping transfer of the production of those items to Russia, but rather to restore the necessary ties with the CIS enterprises. Goskomoboronprom is devoting the most steadfast attention to this.

Sixteen agreements and a resolution for cooperation with the corresponding bodies of those states were signed in 1993, and twelve intergovernmental agreements were prepared. Intergovernmental agreements are being prepared for signing on cooperation, the specialization of the defense enterprises and the list of mutual deliveries of constituent items.

There is another acute problem as well—the mobilization preparation of enterprises and organizations in the defense sectors is still conducted according to outmoded targets. The necessity of cutting back the number of customer requisitions that tie up significant production floor space and equipment for the volumes of deliveries of arms and military hardware during emergency periods has become acute with the adoption of the military doctrine. All of this has naturally had an effect on the work results for 1993, when defense enterprises continued to work under conditions of the complex and multilevel process that is the sweeping conversion of military production. The unsurmounted consequences of the deep cutbacks in the production of arms that was undertaken in 1992 also had an effect. This largely explains the decline of 17.2 percent in the volume of industrial production in November of 1993 compared to the corresponding period for 1992, and of 18.3 percent from the start of 1993 through November compared to the same period for 1992.

The defense enterprises that possess unique personnel and production potential, essentially a national treasure of the country, are actively seeking their place in the market economy.

Goskomoboronprom is striving persistently in this regard to achieve an expansion of the capabilities of the enterprises and organizations in the realm of the export of products and services, as a condition for ensuring market competitiveness and obtaining additional funds for the structural restructuring of industrial enterprises and science.

A conceptual framework for the development of the armed forces and a program for equipping them for the future—an arms program that is balanced with regard to the economic capabilities of the country and ensures its defensive capability and security—will have to be developed and approved with a regard for the provisions of the country's military doctrine. Clarity must be achieved in defense orders, along with their financing for at least two or three years ahead. A stable defense budget and indexing of defense appropriations suitable to the increase in expenditures are needed.

A legislative basis in the realm of military-economic planning, along with the legislative codification of the status of the defense order and the status and rights of enterprises taking part in the fulfillment of the state order for the needs of defense, are necessary. The placement of defense orders should be by contract (aside from

those cases stipulated by anti-monopoly legislation), which will rule out the forcing of an unprofitable order on an enterprise.

The contract for the fulfillment of the defense order should unconditionally be advantageous for the enterprise, both through the establishment of a contract price and through the granting of certain tax, export-import or other concessions, which should also be legislatively codified. Any discrimination according to the forms of ownership should be impermissible with regard to the status of the enterprises taking part in the fulfillment of the defense order.

The Law on Conversion—adopted but effectively not in force—is in need of a profound reworking in this regard, and it should envisage real compensatory guarantees for the cancellation or withdrawal of a defense order, including compensation for spending to refit production, the creation of jobs in the civilian sphere, the retraining of personnel, social assistance for laid-off workers and support for the regions most affected by conversion.

A state program adopted at the federal level is necessary to support the structural re-orientation of the defense industry, to include direct financing for the creation of new jobs, assistance to regions, targeted subsidies for specific conversion programs, tax concessions for the enterprises being converted and social assistance.

The enterprises in the defense complex have experienced a very difficult two years of very rapid conversion against a background of economic crisis and political instability. They have every opportunity not only to survive, but also to develop under market conditions. Assistance for that is therefore a most important task facing federal bodies and the new parliament.

The state of the greater portion of the enterprises and organizations in the defense complex remains a difficult one, of course, and much could be said about that for a long time.

Only one thing must be emphasized. The enterprises of the defense complex, albeit with great difficulty, are adapting to the new conditions nonetheless. This is finding support on the part of the government and other state administrative structures.

The assurance of the steady operation of the defense complex under today's difficult conditions is considered to be one of the defining tasks in the cause of the country's security and the effectiveness of the functioning of the economy as a whole.

The consideration of this issue by the Security Council of the Russian Federation testifies to the particular attention toward the situation.

The President has issued edicts on the specific features of the privatization of enterprises in the defense sectors and the stabilization of the situation of enterprises and organizations in the defense complex along with measures to provide for state orders. These edicts envisage,

in particular, changes in the fixed levels of profitability of various types of products and a doubling of the threshold level of expenses for wages, and regulate advance payments for work under state orders.

A session of the presidium of the government was also held, and introduced clarity into the defense orders for 1994.

The conversion programs, in light of the requirements of Edict No. 1850 of the President of the Russian Federation of 6 November 1993, should be reviewed in the near future proceeding from their economic efficiency. The shutdown of programs that have not justified themselves, the finding of additional opportunities for the financing of programs through local sources, the funds of enterprises and commercial structures and the provision of more profound substantiation of sales markets and the market competitiveness of products being created are what they have in mind therein.

The defense enterprises, with their specific nature, are an inseparable part of the overall industrial complex of the regions. It is namely for that reason that Goskomoborprom proceeds in its industrial policy from the unity of its sector and regional aspects, and from the necessity of ensuring full accounting and balance of both federal and regional or local goals and interests.

The realization of these edicts of the President of the Russian Federation and the governmental decrees, along with the implementation of the basic guidelines that have been set forth and the provisions of the conceptual framework for industrial policy in the defense complex that have been devised, should facilitate the curtailment of crisis development, an increase in the controllability of this sector of the economy and the stabilization of its production activity.

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Statistics on Deepening Crisis in Defense Industries

94UM0458A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian No 99 (523), 1 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by D. A. Belyayev, chief, Production Analysis and Forecasting Administration, Center for Economic Conditions under Russian Federation Government: "Conversion of Military Production"]

[Text] The production slump in defense sectors of industry continued to deepen in the first quarter of 1994. According to Russian Federation Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] data, the reduction in product output was 35 percent with respect to the first quarter of last year, which is more than for industry as a whole (25 percent). According to 1993 results, the production slump in the defense complex was 16 percent, i.e., it was equal to the Russian Federation industry average.

The drop in production affected all defense sectors without exception. Compared with the first quarter of

1993, product output was cut almost in half at enterprises of the aircraft industry and armament industry and by 40 percent in the electronics industry and communications equipment industry. A significant reduction in production volume also is seen in the atomic industry, previously distinguished by stability.

The output of defense products was reduced by 40 percent in the first quarter. Its rates of reduction continue to exceed those of civilian production, but a trend has appeared toward rates of decline in military and civilian production gradually drawing together.

The reduction in output of civilian products, which was 11 percent in the defense complex according to 1993 results, accelerated in the fourth quarter of that same year, and during January-March 1994 reached 33 percent compared with the corresponding period of last year. For the first time during conversion the slump in production of civilian products proved more substantial than in civilian sectors of production. A further drop in output of civilian products for technical and production purposes was predetermined by the continuing limited nature of investment opportunities for all consumers of machine-building products. As a result of a drop in demand on the part of light industry, the agro-industrial complex, transportation and a number of other sectors, output of equipment for light industry in the defense complex fell by 55 percent in the first quarter of 1994, output of equipment for processing sectors of the agro-industrial complex fell by 44 percent, output of equipment for trade and public dining fell by 41 percent, output of mainline freight cars fell by 76 percent and so on. At the same time, the need for replacing equipment in sectors where the defense complex is the major supplier remains very high. For example, the proportion of main technological equipment in light industry over 10 years of age was one-third as of the end of 1992, including more than a third of spinning machines and almost half of looms. Existing replacement rates of main kinds of technological equipment in light industry (around 3-5 percent a year) make its overcoming of technological backwardness, transition to new technologies and output of competitive products problematical. The very same situation also is taking shape in other sectors of the economy putting out products needed by the country's economy and its population.

Production of consumer goods in defense sectors developed relatively successfully in 1993. With an overall 7 percent reduction for many of the most important kinds, a production growth of 7 percent was achieved for television sets (including 4 percent for color sets), 7 percent for refrigerators and freezers, 1.2-1.4 times for small farm machinery, and more than one and one-half times for automobile spare parts.

But a trend toward a slump in production of non-food consumer goods (less light industry) appeared in the defense complex in the fall of last year, and their output in the first quarter of 1994 was only 63 percent of the first quarter of 1993 (70 percent for industry as a whole).

The production of television sets (including color sets), knitting machines, electric meat cutters and juicers was cut by a fourth, and that of washing machines, electric vacuum cleaners, radios, bicycles, sewing machines, and paints and varnishes by half. The output of tape recorders, microcalculators, cameras and motorcycles was cut by almost two-thirds, and children's strollers and bicycles by three-fourths. Production of multipurpose kitchen appliances remained at the previous level. The production of double and triple refrigerators rose somewhat. Population demand is of greatest importance here. Imported durable goods are beginning to occupy an ever greater proportion in satisfying that demand. Therefore substantially increasing quality characteristics, technical level and, as a result, competitiveness of goods manufactured for the population while observing a sensible pricing policy becomes one of the main tasks of defense sector enterprises.

The process of a decline in capital investments in enterprises of Goskomoboronprom [State Committee for the Defense Industry] continued in 1993 against the background of an overall reduction in investments in all sectors of the national economy.

In 1993 Goskomoboronprom enterprises assimilated R530.2 billion from all sources of financing, which, according to the center's calculations, is 36 percent lower in comparable prices than in 1992. The decline in volumes of capital investments was 29 percent for industry as a whole, including machine-building. There was a reduction from 2.8 percent in 1992 to 2.1 percent in 1993 in the proportion of capital investments assimilated by Goskomoboronprom enterprises and organizations in the overall volume of capital investments for the national economy.

Under conditions of a limitation of financial resources, there was a reorientation in use of funds in Goskomoboronprom enterprises from the construction of production facilities to the construction of nonproduction facilities. While 62 percent of the total volume of capital investments were expended for production construction in 1992, it was 55 percent in 1993. The proportion of funds being directed toward production construction was 60 percent for the national economy as a whole. As a result of a redistribution of funds, 1.6 million m² of housing were placed in use, which is 16 percent below last year's level, but the overall reduction of investments for Goskomoboronprom was more significant.

Internal and borrowed funds of enterprises continue to be the basic source for financing capital construction, despite the fact that their proportion in the overall volume of capital investments dropped from 88 percent in 1992 to 84 percent in 1993.

The proportion of centralized capital investments increased from 12 percent to 16 percent. In 1993 the volume of centralized capital investments increased, albeit slightly, at the expense of funds of local budgets, which previously essentially had not financed the

defense industry. While R0.3 billion were allocated to defense enterprises from local budgets in 1992, it was R5.2 billion in 1993 (in existing prices of the corresponding years). The greatest proportion of investments from centralized sources was directed toward developing the shipbuilding industry (21 percent) and armament industry (18 percent).

Assimilation of capital investments in Goskomoboron-prom enterprises on the territory of Russia in 1993 was concentrated basically in two economic areas. Central and Urals, where almost half of all capital investments were assimilated. With respect to centralized investments, the Central area accounts for a third.

The direction of qualitative improvement both of military as well as civilian products remains one of the main tasks of defense complex investment policy even under the extremely difficult conditions which have taken shape. It is necessary to consistently implement a line toward tying in investment activity above all with qualitative parameters of manufactured products, since measures of state paternalism alone cannot protect the domestic market against the inflow of imported products nor preserve positions of military equipment in world markets.

The number of industrial-production personnel in the defense complex declined by 14 percent in the first quarter compared with the first quarter of 1993, which is somewhat greater than last year (12 percent). The outflow of the labor force from defense sectors is occurring faster than for industry as a whole. As happened last year, the greatest first quarter drop in numbers occurred in the electronics industry, where a deep production slump and the lowest pay (two times lower than for the industry average) are seen.

Defense Production Complex Falters

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[Editorial report] Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks in Russian at 2310 GMT on 4 June 94 carries its regular "Aty-Baty" program. This segment is dedicated to the economic plight of Russia's military industrial complex, and carries interviews with P. V. Romanov, deputy of the Federation Council and general director of Yenisey Chemical Combine Production Association in Krasnoyarsk, and A. A. Piskunov, deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee. The interview starts with Romanov describing the situation in the country as a "threefold economical, political, and social dead end," and calls for an urgent review of the market policy to prevent unpredictable consequences.

Video cuts to show footage of an unidentified plant manufacturing engines while announcer compares Russian military production, which shrunk 42 percent in the last three years, to that of the United States and European countries.

In answering a question on the military industrial complex's economic situation, Piskunov says that soaring armament prices cause increasing tensions in both military units and the defense industry. Outlining national defense expenses, Piskunov says that pay for military personnel and expenses for energy, transportation, maintenance, and housing construction amount to about 70 percent of the defense budget, while expenses for purchasing arms and for research and development are close to 31 percent.

Romanov then criticizes the privatization program as ill planned and too headlong, and says: "Three years ago, our economy was grinding to a halt, to put it mildly. Today the Russian economy is close to collapse. The difference between a collapse and a halt is while we used to have plants, factories and working crews, today all of this is entering a stage of dissolution." He goes on to say that an industrial system built around central state control cannot be converted to a market economy overnight, without a transition period.

Commenting on the possibility of strikes in the military industrial sector, Romanov says that the labor unions are "completely passive" and do not protect the interests of workers, who get no pay for several months on end. He says: "Proudly looking the Russian people in the eye from television screens, we say that we have lowered the inflation rate. But we lowered it by withholding pay and lowering the production rate."

Video cuts to show more shots of unidentified machine plant production line while announcer says that while several years ago the lives of about 30 million people were connected with the defense industry, today the number has fallen to 14 million.

Piskunov then further comments on defense expenses, saying: "We have reduced expenses for arms purchases sevenfold or eightfold in the last two or three years. While we used to buy thousands of units of certain categories of weapons, today we buy single units." He then cautions that the virtual stoppage of production at military plants causes irreversible processes, such as loss of specialists and cutting edge technologies. Piskunov then says: "In complex production spheres, such as plane building, missile building, and ammunition chemistry, we are close to finding ourselves in a situation where we are no longer able to produce armaments."

In speaking of workers' pay, Romanov tells of the inability to attract skilled personnel, who leave for better paying enterprises, some of them abroad, thus channeling military technologies there. He concludes his interview by emphasizing the need for a clear economic plan and the determination to carry it out.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Lessons of Conflict on Russia's Periphery

94UAI0462A Moscow VOYENNYI VESTNIK in Russian
No 2, Feb 1994 (signed to press 24 Jan 94) pp 14-17

[Article by Col V. Cheban, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Some Lessons From Armed Conflicts"]

[Text] *In various regions of the former Union, pockets of armed conflicts die out and then flare up with new strength. They sow death and destruction; thousands of refugees end up without a roof over their head and without the means of existence.*

Why have these tragic events become possible? What are their lessons? How do they reflect on the security of the Russian Federation?

Colonel V. Cheban, doctor of philosophical sciences, discusses these problems on the pages of the journal.

Armed conflicts in Nagornyy Karabakh, Moldova, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia differ in scale, nature, and intensity, but have one thing in common. They are accentuated by the death and grief of many thousands of totally innocent people. The process of disintegration of the former Union and the sovereignization of individual republics is taking place considerably more painfully and tragically than initially seemed. There was no civilized division of the territory and economic, scientific-technical, and military potential of the once powerful superpower.

Just what are the bitter lessons of the armed conflicts taking place on the territory of the former Union?

Lesson One. Above all, what is striking is the fact that the creation of independent states is taking place on the basis of absolutization by certain social forces and sections of society of their interests exclusively, while completely ignoring the quite just interests of other people. Nationalism, political ambitiousness, and separatism have one common denominator—egoism. It is this that blinds leaders, social trends, and social forces when vitally important problems are being resolved. Inability, impatience, and unwillingness of leaders, social groupings, and government circles to resolve unsettled problems by a civilized method naturally bring egoism and ambitiousness to a most extreme and dangerous form of their manifestation—to armed violence. Here the assumption is made on using fear as the main instrument of socio-psychological control of society or its individual groups. A shifting of priorities of dominating or imposing one's will on others in the direction of moral and physical terror is indicated by the inability or unwillingness to handle the situation by other unarmed means.

Lesson Two. Destruction of statehood, the lack of a legal system of coordinates, the arising legal nihilism of citizens, aggravation of social contradictions, decline in the standard of living, endless wide-scale social experiments

exhausting the patience of the people, and the limit of trust in the leadership at all levels create favorable conditions for armed conflicts.

In addition, extreme in criticism of law enforcement agencies, institutions of state security, internal affairs bodies, and the army, along with searching for real shortcomings, not only makes it difficult for these institutions to perform state functions but also undermines their authority as a barrier in the path of destructive forces and criminals.

The hasty and accelerated division of the armed forces and the rash "privatization" of combat equipment and armament resulted in weapons not only becoming a terrible tool in the hands of extremists and criminals but also one of the most popular instruments of "big-time politics."

Lesson Three. The long struggle with the "center" and the charged state of lower power structures and administrative formations for confrontation with higher authorities resulted in the boomerang effect: the initiator of criticism of the center is itself becoming the object of criticism "from below." The republics' struggle against the Union center turned into a struggle of autonomies against the former republics. For example, Georgia's persistent desire to leave the Union and the endless accusations against Moscow of "interference" and "imperial ways" led to Georgia itself being on the verge of collapse. Abkhazia and Osetia have tried to "swallow" sovereignty as much as they wanted, and the Georgian government sent military there. Now charges of "imperial ways" and "genocide" have been made against Tbilisi.

Moldova acted similarly with respect to the former Union. The desire to move a little farther away from the "totalitarian regime of Moscow" was encouraged in every way at the state and public levels. However, it took the Dniester region to declare its right to independence (particularly after a discriminatory law on a state language was passed in Moldova), and the leadership of Moldova began to restore "constitutional order" by force of arms. The struggle with "separatists" developed into a real war against its own people.

Ukraine also has not been spared from the boomerang of sovereignization. If you consider that the Crimea, Western Ukraine, and its eastern areas have an eye on independence, the future is not problem-free in this respect.

The development of events in the Dniester region is also similar to the Baltic region. Here there is an absolutization of only the national interests, with complete ignoring of the interests of the Russian-speaking population.

The epidemic of sovereignization has also infected Russia. Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechen, and also regions of the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East are

hatching not only theoretical but also practical plans for establishing their independence from the Russian center. So, the formula "trouble comes to him who makes trouble for others" is most appropriate for illustrating the current method of sovereignization, when the egoistic, aggressive method is the most popular.

Lesson Four. Armed conflicts have shown that despite the proclaimed end of the Cold War and the loud statements about the de-ideologization of international, interethnic, and other social relations, they are still tied to the old normal routine of the past of confrontation between social systems and ideological biases. Gravitation toward the old method of resolving unsettled problems leads to the fact that something fundamentally new is not emerging, but something old and well-known is being revived.

Thus, for the Baltic region, the "renewal" developed into the restoration of laws from the 1940's.

For the Transcaucasus, the 1920's have been taken as the reference point, when the violent processes of sovereignization took place against the background of a general transformation of the Russian Empire.

In Central Asia, renewal was directed even deeper into the past, out of loyalty to old medieval traditions, beginning with absolutization of religion and its role in the spiritual life of society and ending with the unprecedented honoring of the "great people": the bays, khans, emirs, and the like.

Renewal in Ukraine includes resuscitation of nationalistic-type trends, movements, and organizations, which in the past fought against the Soviet Union on the side of Hitler.

Armed conflicts also are not isolated from geopolitical relations and the interests of foreign states. Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, not to mention the United States, Germany, Japan, France, and Great Britain, are closely observing events on the territory of the former Union. And observation is developing into an active military policy.

For example, a violation of human rights in the Baltic is not noticed by either the United States, Germany, Japan, France, or England, since they are traditionally impressed by the "bold actions of small states" against the "Russian Empire." They do not conceal the plans for armed intervention in the event "Russia attacks Lithuania."

Lesson Five. The same pattern of the outbreak and development of armed conflicts is repeated. Initially, one of the belligerents makes an unambiguous threat to use weapons. Then shots actually ring out, which "fortunately" do not result in casualties. Then exchanges of gunfire between "unknown persons" begin, this time resulting in casualties.

At this time, various versions and assumptions emerge and are circulated in public opinion, and the initiators of the conflict closely monitor the nature of the reaction to

the armed clashes. If a wave of indignation rises over isolated incidents of terror, the armed actions temporarily die down. When they pass by the "angry vessel" of public opinion, the next step is taken: an armed attack of a wider scale is made.

It is natural that retaliatory measures immediately follow with such a development of events, and new victims appear. The initiators of the conflict present these victims as a reason for further escalation of tension and confrontation. A new spiral in the bloody fighting begins.

As an analysis of events shows, the flywheel of armed conflicts unwinds according to this sinister scenario largely because one of the main conditions for ending them is not met: the public does not receive a timely and specific answer to the question. Who is to blame? The concept of "aggressor" has virtually disappeared from diplomatic and political affairs. Meanwhile, the analysis and prevention of any conflict also begin with the clear definition of this "character." Dissolution of the "aggressor" in a mass of abstract factors gives him an incentive for further aggressive actions and makes the victim even more defenseless.

Lesson Six. Armed conflicts are noted for special cruelty with respect to the totally innocent population. This largely explains the great losses among residents of cities and villages.

The reason is that the use of weapons is intended not so much for destroying the armed enemy as for intimidating and frightening the unarmed person.

For what purpose is this done?

As fact indicate, in order to achieve success in their plans, the participants in armed conflicts strive to intimidate the population supporting the opposing side. However, the fear of being killed and the element of revenge for family and friends who have died even further deform people's psyche, already overloaded with negative emotions. All this leads to even greater bitterness in the merciless fight. Hence the guerrilla-like actions, hostage-taking, sporadic exchanges of gunfire, and the lack of a rigid centralization in the subordination of various paramilitary formations due to the "independence" of the fighters.

Lesson Seven. All the capabilities of the ties between themselves, both for vertical structures of the opposing sides (government—army—local authorities—local internal affairs bodies—individual citizens) and for contacts between them horizontally (government to government; army to army; social movements to social movements; local members of parliament to local members of parliament from the other side; fraternization of persons involved directly in the conflict), are far from being fully utilized for blocking and ending the armed conflicts.

The distinctive protective functions of the "monasteries," which virtually all military garrisons have and where peaceloving citizens can take shelter from terrorism, are also being used insufficiently.

A serious obstacle to putting a stop to armed conflicts in the initial stage is the false shame of ruling circles and social movements in taking decisive measures for fear of being categorized as "undemocratic," "uncivilized," "imperial," "hegemonic," "totalitarian," and the like. As a result, in striving to preserve political virginity, the governments of neighboring countries free the hands of the aggressor through their inaction.

Lesson Eight. In an interrelated and interdependent world, armed conflicts do not pass without a trace. They are transformed and influence many states and peoples through a system of economic, political, and geopolitical ties. Disruption or severing of economic and trade ties adversely affects the economic life of countries far from

the conflict. In turn, discrediting, violating human rights, persecution, and genocide create a migratory wave that is capable of tearing down the social foundations in neighboring states, aggravating the internal situation in them, and causing new conflicts.

It is never someone else's problem. It is necessary to treat all conflicts with heightened attention. That is why one should master **lesson nine**. It is necessary to fight armed conflicts, as well as wars, long before they break out. For this purpose it is necessary to have a developed system of blocking armed conflicts and an effective mechanism for preventing and stopping them.

This discussion will continue in the next article.

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